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# IMMIGRATION

## AUSTRALIA'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

BY

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The manuscript of this book was completed in London in June 1948. There I was able to study current British and European attitudes to emigration, and was generously assisted in this task by the staffs of the libraries at the London School of Economics, Chatham House, and Australia House. I am also grateful to Professor A. H. McDonald, who arrived in London in time to read the manuscript and to make many helpful suggestions, particularly on points relating to current developments in Australia; to Miss M. Kingston, then Secretary of the Commonwealth Council of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and to her successor, Mr George Caiger, who gave invaluable assistance from the outset; and to Miss M. Weigall, the Secretary of the New South Wales Branch of the Institute, who made many inquiries on my behalf.

Finally, I must acknowledge the courtesy of the Publishers who permitted me, after my return to Sydney in June 1949, to make some substantial textual alterations to the proofs of the book. These amendments were concerned more with interpretation than with factual data, which for the most part is not taken beyond June 1948.

W. D. BORRIE

*London,  
July 1949*



## INTRODUCTION

THE objects of this brief work are, first, to consider the immigration plans that are being prepared in Australia against the background of the absorptive capacity of the country and of the demographic and economic trends in areas from which migrants are being sought; and second, to discuss some of the new problems that are likely to arise as a result of the present attempt to attain an annual target of 70,000 white immigrants a year. Thus this study is essentially an appraisal of contemporary immigration policy. It is not a history. This approach is not meant to imply that the history of this subject has been exhausted, or that what has been done is unimportant. Some excellent work has been produced.<sup>1</sup> But much remains to be done, and the limitations of this booklet are largely due to the gaps that exist in the history of the subject. We know little yet, for example, of the extent to which immigrants have become assimilated, or to which the social environment of Australia has been moulded by ideas and customs that were transferred with the migrants to this country.

Nevertheless, the absence of adequate information on these historical aspects should not deter us from attempting a discussion of the contemporary immigration problem. This is urgently necessary, because Australia's immigration plans are being prepared at the moment when the full force of the modern demographic revolution is being felt, and the thesis here presented is briefly that, to be realistic, any discussion of those plans must take cognizance of trends in Eastern as well as in Western countries, for the solution of population problems in Australia will be determined by the alleviation of population pressure in Asia as well as by probable trends in the birth-rate and the economic organization of the Western world.

The discussion which follows is based primarily upon developments up to June, 1948. By the time this book becomes available to the public events will necessarily have moved ahead of some of the facts here recorded; but every endeavour has been made to present the discussion of problems and prospects from a reasonably long-term point of view, so that such factors as the inflow of an

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<sup>1</sup> See *Bibliographical Notes*.

increased number of migrants as more ships become available, or new developments in social services, should not invalidate the main thesis.

To the reader it may appear that *problems* have been given greater emphasis than *prospects*, but no apology is offered for this approach. The author merely hopes that he will help to restore the balance, because most of the recent literature on this subject has tended to minimize problems. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that this discussion of problems and prospects is not meant to imply a negative attitude towards the question of population increase. The necessity for a vigorous immigration policy to provide a substantial increase in Australia's population is accepted as axiomatic, but such increase can be achieved only if certain basic and weighty problems are squarely faced and overcome. What this book attempts is an outline of some of these problems, and if it helps to promote an interest in, and assists the promotion of a realistic policy it will have achieved its primary object.

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## CHAPTER I

### DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN AUSTRALIA

THE demographic situation of Australia today requires no elaborate treatment, for the effect of the decline in the Australian birth-rate has been given considerable publicity during the past twenty years—and, indeed, before that. It is of interest to note that the first official inquiry in modern times in the British world on the subject of the birth-rate was undertaken by a Royal Commission of the Government of New South Wales in 1904. That Commission expressed grave concern about Australian fertility at a time when the birth-rate was approximately one-third higher than it is at the present day. The concern expressed then, however, was not followed by a constructive policy, and it was not until the years of economic depression after 1929 that the birth-rate again received any widespread attention.

The full extent of the decline in Australian fertility and its implications for the future growth of the population were brilliantly analysed by S. H. Wolstenholme in 1936,<sup>1</sup> when he showed that without immigration, and assuming that mortality and natality would remain at the 1932-4 level, the Australian population would reach a maximum of 7.88 million in 1977, and thereafter decline; and that even with the steady influx of immigrants at the rate of 40,000 a year—the equivalent of the number absorbed at the peak years of immigration prevailing between 1922-9—the decline in population would only be postponed for a short period, a maximum of 8.94 million being attained in 1981.

Revelations such as this, which were similar to prognoses made in many Western countries, revived the cry that Australia must “populate or perish”. It was apparent, however, that during the economic chaos of the depression years the absorptive capacity of the country was practically nil, and it was not until the two years preceding the outbreak of war in 1939 that the *emigration* that had occurred since 1929 was checked. Further, there was no marked upward swing in the birth-rate in the immediate post-depression

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<sup>1</sup> Wolstenholme, S. H., “The Future of the Australian Population”, *Economic Record*, vol. xii, no. 23 (December 1936).

years, and Wolstenholme's estimates were accepted as a highly probable picture of the future of the Australian population.

Since the outbreak of the second World War in 1939 there has been prevalent in Australia a considerable amount of optimism concerning the birth-rate and also concerning the absorptive capacity of the country for immigrants. The latter factor is the subject for further discussion in this study; but let us pause at this point to consider whether this war-time boom in the birth-rate really does invalidate the rather gloomy forecasts made by Wolstenholme eleven years ago.

TABLE I  
AUSTRALIAN VITAL STATISTICS

Year	Population in thousands	Crude Marriage Rate	Crude Birth- rate	Rate of Natural Increase
1921	5511	8.6	25.0	15.04
1923	5756	7.8	23.8	13.87
1925	6003	7.9	22.9	13.67
1927	6251	7.9	21.6	12.20
1929	6436	7.4	20.3	10.73
1931	6553	6.0	18.2	9.49
1933	6656	7.0	16.8	7.86
1935	6753	8.5	16.6	7.09
1937	6867	8.7	17.4	7.99
1939	6997	9.2	17.7	7.72
1941	7133	10.6	18.9	8.92
1943	7257	9.4	20.7	10.36
1945	7414	8.5	21.8	12.25
1946	7519	10.6	23.6	13.60

Considered in terms of the crude birth-rate the situation appears to provide grounds for optimism. The depression birth-rate of 16.8 per thousand of population in 1933 rose steadily to 20.7 in 1943, and again to 23.6 in 1946; and when this is measured beside the extremely low death-rate of the Australian population, the rate of natural increase per year appears substantial. But the crude birth-rate is a deceptive index because it does not take into account the age-grouping of the population, the fluctuation in the marriage rate, or the size of the completed family. The post-depression rise in the birth-rate has partly been a reflection of the rising marriage rate. A normal marriage rate for the age structure and masculinity of the Australian population is in the region of 8 per thousand of population, but in 1942 this rate had soared to the astronomical figure of 12 per thousand, and for obvious reasons this rate could not be maintained over a long period.

Another factor in the increase in the birth-rate after the lifting

of the economic depression was what we may term "postponed births", that is children born to parents who married during the depression but who decided to delay the birth of a child until economic conditions improved. Since 1941, too, the increase in the birth-rate appears to have been due primarily to an increase in births to older women married before the war, and not to the higher fertility of war-time marriages.

When we consider recent trends in terms of the net reproduction rate, which measures the extent to which women of childbearing age are replacing themselves as a result of the birth of female children who will survive to become the potential mothers of the next generation, and which in this way eliminates the factor of age structure, we notice that the increase has been from a rate of 0.959 in 1944 to 1.328 in 1946. But here again this does not justify the conclusion that the basis has been laid for a permanent increase of population through the factor of fertility, for that reproduction rate is also affected by such factors as the proportion of women marrying and the duration of marriage. When an adjustment is made for these factors the extent of the increase, although significant, is less marked.<sup>2</sup>

TABLE II<sup>3</sup>  
CRUDE BIRTH-RATES AND NET REPRODUCTION RATES, AUSTRALIA

Year	Crude Birth-rate	Net Reproduction Rate
1881	35.3	1.88
1901	27.2	1.39
1921	25.0	1.313
1926	22.0	1.225
1931	18.2	1.043
1936	17.1	0.975
1941	18.9	1.068
1943	20.6	1.148
1945	21.7	1.227
1946	23.6	1.328

With the inevitable slump in marriages that must follow in the post-war years (the crude marriage rate had already fallen to 8.52 in 1945 from the peak of 12.01 in 1942) it is reasonably safe to conclude that the reproduction rate of Australia will also fall below the high rates of recent years. This conclusion can only be invalidated by an increase in the size of the completed family in Australia; and as there is no clear indication that this will be the case, and as the war-time

2 For an analysis of Australian demographic trends to 1943 see The Australian National Health and Medical Research Council, 18th Report, 1944. See also P. H. Karmel, "Fertility and Marriages in Australia," *The Economic Record* June 1944, pp. 71-80, and C. Clark and R.E. Dyne, "Application and Extensions of the Karmel Formula," *ibid.* June 1946, pp. 23-9.

3 Figures from the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council, 18th Report, p. 19.

trends we have observed do not show that the long-term trend towards a smaller family unit, which has been a persistent development in this and other Western countries over the past fifty years, has been reversed, it seems reasonable to state that any forecast of the future of the Australian population should be based upon immediate pre-war fertility patterns—that is, the last years when comparatively normal marriage trends applied—and not upon the abnormal war-time rates<sup>4</sup>.

A forecast based on such an assumption has been given in the report of the 18th session of the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (see Table III). This projection assumes that the natural increase of Australia in the decade 1940-50 will be 670,000, that thereafter the net reproduction rate of 0.925 will prevail, and that over the whole period there will be a slow fall in mortality. The result is, immigration excluded, that the Australian population will attain a maximum of 8.2 million in 1980 and thereafter decline to 7.98 million in 2000. These figures show a slight improvement upon the projections of Wolstenholme, but the general picture revealed here is substantially the same as the projections of 1936.

Of greater importance than the mere statement of totals is the age-grouping of the population that is implied. The increase will be proportionately greater with age, the over-65 group increasing from 0.51 million in 1940 to 1.06 million in 1980 and again to 1.11 million in 2000. This increase may more than offset the probable decrease in the juvenile group under 20 years of age. The increase in the working population aged 20-64 will be comparatively slight, from

TABLE III<sup>5</sup>

## PROJECTION OF FUTURE POPULATION IN AGE GROUPS (MILLIONS)

<i>Age-group</i>	..	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Under 20	..	2.37	2.45	2.46	2.25	2.28	2.22	2.12
20-49	..	3.14	3.40	3.38	3.50	3.36	3.39	3.20
50-64	..	1.01	1.20	1.28	1.45	1.50	1.37	1.55
Breadwinners (20-64)	..	4.15	4.60	4.66	4.95	4.86	4.76	4.75
Dependent (65 and over)	..	0.51	0.66	0.85	0.94	1.06	1.15	1.11
Total	..	7.03	7.71	7.97	8.14	8.20	8.13	7.98

<sup>4</sup> The analysis of war-time figures in Australia and England and Wales does reveal, however, that the long-term fall in fertility may have been checked. But there is no clear evidence yet that the size of the completed family has been increasing since 1939. See Chapter IV for a discussion of recent birth trends in England and Wales.

<sup>5</sup> Figures adapted from the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council's 18th Report, p. 21.

4.15 million in 1940 to 4.86 million in 1980, and this will be followed by a decline to 4.75 million in 2000.

The significance of these figures is clear. In effect, without immigration, the Australian breadwinning population will be asked in the near future to support a heavy burden of aged dependency and to provide the manpower for that industrial expansion which both the government and the owners of capital confidently expect to take place. Without further analysis it can be seen that, in the absence of immigration, increased production will have to be secured by greater output per man hour as a result of improved techniques, or by an increase in the hours worked. Moreover, if the burden of dependency arising from the change in age composition of the population as a result of past trends is to be carried successfully it will be necessary to maintain a high level of employment.

This then is the demographic position of Australia at the moment when the economic structure of the country is in a state of transition. The war has given a tremendous impetus to industrial development and has left the country with the problem of the reconversion of its economy to a peace-time basis, which is the essential prerequisite of further industrial expansion. The war has also created a lag in the quantity of capital equipment available, not merely for the production of a normal supply of consumption goods, but also for the expansion of pre-war industrial establishments. For these reasons there is likely to be a shortage of manpower in the immediate future, unless the comparatively stationary number of breadwinners in the population, whose figures are now being determined by the depression slump in births,<sup>6</sup> can be expanded by the influx of immigrants with the skill and training necessary for their rapid assimilation to the Australian environment. But should Australia aim at a higher level of immigration than that necessary to correct the abnormality in the age structure of the population as a result of the demographic trends of the depression? The answer to this question requires some discussion of Australia's population carrying capacity.

6 An indication of the significance of the past trends in the birth-rate upon the future recruitment to Australia's breadwinning population can be seen from a comparison of the following figures of the juvenile population under 15 since 1921 with those of the total breadwinning population (figures in thousands):

Age-group	1921	1933	1938	1941
0-14 (juvenile dependants) ..	1.724	1.822	1.733	1.715
15-64 (breadwinning) ..	3.472	4.379	4.667	4.865
65 and over (aged dependants) ..	0.321	0.450	0.493	0.522

The figures for "aged dependants" also illustrate the "ageing" of the Australian population, which had already occurred by 1941, for as a percentage of the total population this group increased from 4.4 per cent in 1921 to 7.2 per cent in 1941.

## CHAPTER II

### THE POTENTIALITIES OF AUSTRALIA AS AN IMMIGRANT COUNTRY

THERE has been a tendency for Australians to have an unwarranted optimism concerning the carrying capacity of their vast country. The figures that have been given by many public men during the past six or seven years have usually been based upon other factors than the purely economic potential of Australia. It has frequently been assumed that Australia must have a population of a given size in order to guarantee its security against possible aggression, without any careful scientific analysis to see first if the country can carry, without interfering with the standards of living, the figure they have mentioned.

A typical example of this attitude towards a population "target" was the opinion expressed in the report of the Royal Commission on the Birthrate in New South Wales in 1904.

The extinction of the race will occur within measurable time, and the capacity of the nation to utilise the resources of the state must tend to fail unless the decline in the fertility of the people is checked . . . From time to time public men . . . have referred hopefully to the day when Australia with her teeming millions will hold a commanding place among the peoples of the world. The patriotic ardour inspired by this hopeful anticipation is, however, destined to be cooled in the contemplation of the fact that, while Russia and Japan, prospective rivals of Australia for supremacy in the Western Pacific, are already seeking outlets beyond their own borders for the energies of their ever-growing people, it will be forty-six and a half years before Australia, with her three and three-quarter millions of inhabitants, and dependent alone upon her natural increase . . . will have doubled her population; 113 years before she will have twenty million people; and 168 years before her numbers will have reached the present population of Japan.

Amended slightly to meet changing circumstances, this quotation could be repeated for almost any period since that Commission met. It epitomizes the traditional concept of Australia's population "problem"—the desire to attain a population sufficient to utilize fully the country's resources, the fear that population might be insufficient to meet the threat of aggression, and optimism concerning the future role of the nation.

The optimism revealed in some of these unscientific estimates can no doubt be explained by the traditional attitude of the

nineteenth century towards population growth. When the Commission of 1904 made its report there was little fear that Britain would not be able to continue in her role as an exporter of people to fill the vast empty spaces of the self-governing colonies. But when we come to the post 1914-18 vision of an Australia carrying a hundred or even two hundred million people, and solving Britain's unemployment problem in the matter of five years by the transfer of one and a half million people from Britain's tight little isles to Australia's expansive countryside, we reach not only the height of optimism but also the height of absurdity. It may be that the developments in science, in industrial techniques and in the use of synthetics may ultimately enable Australia to carry a hundred million people without seriously interfering with existing standards of living; but it is impossible to anticipate the long-term developments in the scientific and technical fields that will render this possible, so that when we talk of the carrying capacity of Australia we have no alternative, if we are to be realistic, but to base our estimate upon known factors.

Another weakness of estimates—or rather guesses—of the population that Australia *must* carry is that the figure we should like to attain may not be possible of attainment because of external factors over which we have no control. The demographic revolution that the Western world has undergone during the last generation has affected the whole scene in regard to immigration into Australia from the traditional sources of northern and western Europe. Thus more practical than a discussion of the optimum which Australia might be able to carry is consideration of the numbers, with the skill and aptitude necessary to assimilate them to the Australian way of life, which can now be acquired. We will return to this aspect of the subject later. Let us now consider this matter of the optimum a little more closely.

A number of estimates have been made of Australia's carrying capacity and they vary from approximately sixteen million to one hundred million.<sup>1</sup> The basis upon which these estimates have been calculated requires no further discussion here because they are already available in published literature. But their wide diversity in itself throws doubt upon their real value in relation to a practical policy of immigration. Those estimates that can be said to have a scientific approach, for example, those of Professor Griffith Taylor

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of Australia's carrying capacity, see Australian Institute of International Affairs, *Australian Population* (supplementary Papers, Series A, prepared for the British Commonwealth Relations Conference, Lapstone, 1938), and Taylor, G. T., *Environment, Race and Migration* (Toronto, 1937). These and other views are ably summarized in W. D. Forsyth's *The Myth of Open Spaces* (Melbourne, 1942).

and Dr J. Andrews, place the population that Australia might carry, at existing or higher standards of living, at approximately twenty million people. None of them anticipates the closer settlement of Australia's interior or northern lands. Rather they see an increase in population being absorbed into those regions that were already settled by approximately 1880.

Now at this point we need to emphasize the relationship between carrying capacity and the type of population Australia intends to acquire. If we are concerned only with the number of people that can be supported at a subsistence level of economy it is probable that Australia can carry a great number of people, perhaps even the maximum of two hundred million which is given by some propagandists' estimates. But obviously the discussion on this basis is not realistic, because the Australian people will not be prepared to acquire population merely in the interests of numbers without regard to the type of life to which the existing population has become accustomed. Therefore the optimum must be considered as a population that will not lower, and preferably will improve, existing material standards of life. Considered on this basis the assumption that Australia can carry twenty million people seems reasonable, but this figure may be either raised or lowered in the future by changing economic and international circumstances.

For example, the application of atomic power to industry, the development of synthetic resources, the opening up of new markets for the export of Australian goods, particularly in the Asiatic zone, may raise our carrying capacity considerably above this figure. On the other hand, the collapse of European economy, and particularly of British economy, or the failure of the nations to widen the basis of international trade, may reduce the carrying capacity of Australia, because for some time to come the Australian economy will be affected by the question of exports as much as by internal economic reorganization.

To discuss the carrying capacity beyond this point would tend to raise theoretical problems with little basis in reality. Is any useful purpose served, for example, by estimating the precise population that would provide the highest returns per head if the economy were self-sufficient, or if imports and exports remained constantly at the 1939 level? In practice these factors cannot be held constant, and the actual optimum must vary from year to year. Indeed, we may accept without further discussion the views of the economic theorists who see in the concept of the optimum a figment of the imagination rather than a theory with any practical implications. Nor is much to be gained by endeavouring to ascertain what has

been called the synthetic optimum, that is, taking into account psychological and moral factors as well as the purely economic. For all practical purposes, however, it may be argued that Australia would be in a more secure position, and would be economically in a sounder position than she is in today, if she could double her population by the end of the century.

Some writers still take the view that the insistence of Australia that immigrants should be accepted only if they bring Australia nearer the optimum—that is, if they raise living standards—is highly dangerous in view of the great pressure of vast numbers of Asiatics against the available resources of their own countries.<sup>2</sup> They see Australia being overrun by the Asiatic hordes. Maybe that is the long-term fate of the white countries of the Pacific, and even if they are not overrun it is likely that centuries hence there will be a new Eurasian stock. But again the problems that can be foreseen are not as simple as that, as we shall try to show in a later chapter. Despite the great poverty of Asia—indeed, very largely because of it—the large-scale movement of people from Asia will be difficult for many years to come. Also, Asia cannot quickly attain the power necessary to compel other countries to open their doors to the emigration of its peoples. And finally, emigration is no solution to the Asiatic problem of over-population. The recognition of these facts does not necessarily mean that Australia can afford to ignore the Asiatic problem. They merely emphasize the complexities that have to be faced in dealing with it, and no good purpose can be served by rushing into an immigration policy because of a fear of the quantitative increase of the Asiatic peoples. Under no immigration scheme is it likely that the rate of growth of the Australian population will keep pace with the probable rate of growth in Asia, and Australia may best serve the interests of Asia by a migration scheme that will give her a strong industrial economic system, rather than by throwing her doors wide open to all who wish to enter the country.

Nevertheless, when we consider the question of carrying capacity from the short-term point of view and in relation to the demographic questions discussed in Chapter I, we realize the urgent necessity for introducing immigrants so that advantage can be taken of the economic impetus Australia has enjoyed during the past decade, largely as a result of the second World War of 1939-45. We have shown, for example, that without migrants, and assuming that fertility trends continue at approximately the present level, the Australian population will reach the figure of only 8.2 million by 1980. But more important than this total for the immediate future will

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<sup>2</sup> For example, see Thompson, W. S., *Population and Peace in the Pacific* (Chicago, 1945).

be the recruitment of the breadwinning population, which is now beginning to feel the effects of the decline in the birth-rate after approximately 1925. In the immediate pre-war years roughly 120,000 persons attained the age of 15 each year, 22,000 died between the ages of 15-64 and about 45,000 were reaching the age of 65, leaving a net natural increase in the working age-group of approximately 53,000 a year. By 1948 those attaining the age of 15 will have been reduced to approximately 101,000, while those reaching 65 will have increased to 58,000. When we allow for mortality during working age, this implies a net recruitment to the breadwinning population of only about 20,000 people, or less than half the pre-war figures.

This is the significant demographic fact behind the severe shortage of labour in Australia in the post-war period. The war-time expansion in industry was made possible by large-scale transference through manpower control of men and women from unessential industries—for example, from those manufacturing and distributing luxury and semi-luxury goods—to those vital to the development of the nation's war potential. Scarcely less important was the development of new techniques, many of which were undertaken with material and personnel assistance from the United States of America and Britain. And thirdly, the increase in production was assisted by raising the man hours worked per week and by the payment of overtime rates. The accession in technical knowledge has remained, but the reduction of working hours—with now the virtual establishment of a universal forty-hour week—the return of women temporarily employed in industry during the war to home duties, and the abolition of overtime bonuses have left many industries with severe shortages in their labour supplies. Thus it is probable that without the introduction of immigrants in the immediate future the Australian-born labour force will be insufficient to complete the re-establishment of Australian industry on a peace-time basis and at the same time to restore to normal levels the output of consumer goods. It was estimated before the war that the domestic supply of labour would probably be barely sufficient for the moderate development of secondary and tertiary industries in the ensuing years, and the situation has now been aggravated by the war, which has given an impetus to Australian industrial development and at the same time left the economy with a deficit of the capital equipment necessary for the normal flow of consumer goods. The lack of any substantial increase in Australia's productive population may then, in the absence of immigration, prolong the lag in the post-war period between the replacement and renewal of capital equipment and the flow of goods for consumption. Even allowing for improved

efficiency in industrial techniques, Australia has not the human resources necessary to take full advantage in the immediate post-war years of this potential industrial capacity. Without immigration the lag created by war in housing, educational and hospital accommodation, and plant and machinery cannot be overcome without the severe curtailment of other less vital requirements; and the reorganization of the economy along these lines would require a degree of manpower control that the Government would be reluctant to impose in time of peace. Consequently the Government's plans for the large-scale development of housing, water supply and irrigation, forestry, sewerage and drainage, and roads and bridges, require for their fulfilment an immediate increase in Australia's labour force. It may be argued, of course, that the stabilizing of Australia's economy at pre-war levels would reduce these problems in a considerable measure, but for security reasons alone no Government is likely to commit itself to such a policy. The greater use of the known resources of Australia is an urgent necessity if this country is to strengthen its defences in the case of war, and also if the economy is to be freed from that over-dependence upon primary exports by which alone some measure of insulation can be secured against fluctuations in oversea markets.

Finally, then, what type of immigrant will Australia require in the interests of economic efficiency? Obviously it is no longer a question of securing merely the redundant population of other countries. In the nineteenth century the type of people that Britain and other emigrant countries had to spare suited Australia's requirements reasonably well. The migrants needed neither a high degree of industrial skill nor a substantial amount of capital. There was much truth in the statement to be found in many migrant handbooks that the key to success in colonial life was strong arms and sinews and no fear of hard work. In the future, however, migrants will not be coming to an agricultural economy. The particular type of farming made necessary by the aridity of the Australian soil and the nature of the demand for our primary exports requires a type of skill not easily found in the rural parts of European countries from which immigrants are likely to come. The peasant of Italy, Yugoslavia, and other areas of south-east Europe, where rural population is likely to become redundant to home requirements as industrialization proceeds, is not the person who can be absorbed in large numbers into the Australian rural environment. These people may find employment either as owners or employees in the wine- and sugar-growing districts of the southern States or Queensland,

but the total number that can be absorbed will not add greatly to the Australian population.

As far as the pastoral industries are concerned, the man who can best be trained to make efficient use of resources is the Australian born and reared in the country's rural areas. With the relatively high birth-rate of the rural areas, this section of the Australian population is more than replacing itself and is providing sufficient potential workers both to maintain the production of rural industries and to supply a limited amount of manpower for secondary and tertiary industries.<sup>3</sup> The migrants required in large numbers by Australia are rather those with industrial skill, such as builders, textile workers, and iron and steel workers. And these are the classes that European countries will be reluctant to release and that will be most quickly absorbed into employment as the European economy recovers to a normal level of activity. Nor is it likely that western Europe at least, when economic recovery becomes a reality, will have a surplus of unskilled workers for road and railway construction in Australia. France, Holland, the Scandinavian countries, and Britain are already seeking unskilled workers in large numbers from Europe's displaced persons.

If we now assume that Australia, in the interests of security and economic well-being, must double its population in the minimum of time, how quickly can the gap between our limited rate of natural increase and the figure of fifteen million be closed? The astronomical guesses of the range of one hundred and even two hundred million have now been cast aside by all those with serious interest in Australia's population targets, and it is now commonly accepted that Australia must have from fifteen to twenty million people if she is to have any measure of security and if she is to develop the known resources of the country. Targets of this magnitude will require the introduction of several million migrants during the next generation. The assignment of a target of twenty million people in fifteen to twenty years would involve the average annual increase of five to seven per cent. Australia's natural increase has been under one per cent since 1930, so that this target would mean an increase of from four to six per cent through immigration, or in other words a net annual immigration of 430,000 immediately, and 1,200,000 in approximately fifteen years time. Obviously this figure is beyond the immediate absorptive capacity of Australia. It is questionable whether any country, even in most favourable

<sup>3</sup> An analysis of the fertility of rural and metropolitan areas in 1933 shows that the former had a gross reproduction rate of 1.376 compared with only 0.792 in the latter. Even allowing for differences in marriage ratios, the fertility of rural areas was approximately 27 per cent above that of the cities. This differential is typical of most Western countries.

circumstances, could absorb on the average over any prolonged period more than two per cent of its total numbers. The rate of growth in Australia has at times been above this figure, but it has never been sustained. For example, between 1900 and 1913 the average rate of increase was 2.04 per cent, but over the whole of the twentieth century the average was much below this. It should further be noted that natural increase, and not immigration has provided the major part of population growth during this century.

TABLE IV  
AUSTRALIA: NATURAL INCREASE AND IMMIGRATION:  
RATES OF INCREASE

Period	Interval (years)	Increase during period (millions)	Average annual increase (thousands)	Average Annual Rate of Increase		
				Natural increase (per cent)	Net migration (per cent)	Total (per cent)
1900-13	13	1.13	87	1.59	0.53	2.04
1913-23	10	0.86	86	1.50	0.15	1.64
1923-29	6	0.68	113	1.27	0.64	1.88
1929-39	10	0.56	56	0.82	0.01	0.84

If we assume that Australia can and should absorb an annual average rate of increase of 2 per cent, this would mean the net immigration of approximately 70,000 people each year in the immediate future, that is, allowing for a natural increase of 70,000 or a rate of 1 per cent per annum. This in fact is the approximate immigration figure that the Commonwealth Government has now accepted. Let us now consider how it is proposed to reach this "target".

## CHAPTER III

### POST-WAR IMMIGRATION POLICY

WHILE it is not the intention of this study to discuss at any length the history of Australia's immigration policy, it is nevertheless relevant here to compare the principles of present and past plans before we discuss the techniques of the former.

Broadly it can be said that the post-war immigration policy of Australia is a continuation of pre-war principles. The cornerstone upon which it is built is the maintenance of "White Australia". That this is so has been made abundantly clear from statements by numerous Ministers of the present Government. For example, in 1945 Mr Beasley, then Vice-President of the Executive Council, stated that once there is any compromise on the White Australia Policy, the whole policy will be lost. Or again, in the dispute in the Assembly of the United Nations during its last session in 1946 between the Union of South Africa and India concerning the status of Indians resident in the former country, the Australian delegation, by abstaining from voting on the issue, made it clear that it was not prepared to take any action that might run the risk of opening the door for an attack upon traditional policy. In addition the present Minister of Immigration has, in a number of his many statements in support of the present large-scale immigration policy, stressed the fact that one of the major arguments for an immediate and rapid increase in Australia's population is the need to strengthen the economic and military potential of this country in order to provide security against any renewal of an aggressive policy by an Asiatic country.

Secondly, the present Australian policy still gives priority to immigrants from the United Kingdom and from northern Europe. It is true, as we will show shortly, that the need for immediate large-scale immigration is considered so urgent that the Government is prepared and anxious to accept some immigrants from areas that were not regarded in a favourable light before the war of 1939-45, but this is subsidiary to the main aspects of the Government's plans.

Thirdly, the Government's offer of assistance to many classes of intending immigrants is in line with past policies. Government assistance for immigrants has a long history in Australia and has

been used intermittently since the middle of last century to attract immigrants at times when the Governments felt that the absorptive capacity of the States was greater than the supply of non-subsidized settlers.<sup>1</sup> Government assistance has traditionally been the mechanism by which Australia has attempted to bring this country close enough to Britain and other sources of emigration to enable it to compete with such areas as the United States of America and Canada. During most periods, when the incentive to emigrate was economic and not the result of political or racial persecution, the intending emigrants have been those with little capital; and without assistance either by relatives or by Government the voyage to the antipodes would in many cases have been impossible.

But there the similarity between post-war and pre-war plans ends. Pre-war immigration policies were essentially part of plans for the fuller development of Australia's land and primary products. Generally the migrants sought were not those with a high degree of industrial skill, but rather those who could settle in rural areas. This was true even during the period between the two wars, when the function of immigration was considered in terms of the Empire Settlement Act of 1922. This Act was the product of that unwarranted optimism regarding the economic and demographic future of Britain and the Dominions which was epitomized in the final report of the Dominions Royal Commission in 1917. The motive behind the Act was the redistribution of the white population of the whole Empire, and redistribution was conceived in terms of a vast one-way movement from the heart to the outlying limbs. The Dominions Royal Commission had been careful to consider other aspects of Empire development than land settlement, for its report of 1917 repeatedly drew attention to the industrial potential of the Empire, but it was clear that those who framed the Act of 1922 had in mind the development of primary products rather than of manufactures. The "wide open spaces" of Canada and Australia loomed large in their minds, and in these were to be settled a large proportion of the two hundred million white people who, the supporters of Mr Amery hoped, would eventually find their livelihood within the bounds of the Empire.

An account of the part Australia played in these developments after the war of 1914-18 need not be given here at any length, for it is available elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> Three points might, however, be noticed.

1 The most successful period of assisted immigration in the nineteenth century was between 1851 and 1870, when 307,000 people were assisted to the Australian colonies. Large-scale assistance was not attempted again until 1906, and played an important role between 1911 and 1915, and again, under the Empire Settlement Scheme, between 1921 and 1930 (see Appendix).

2 See, for example, Phillips, P. D., and Wood, G. L., (editors), *The Peopling of Australia* (first series, Melbourne, 1928); Duncan, W. G. K., and Janes, C. V., *The Future of Immigration into Australia and New Zealand* (Sydney, 1937); and Forsyth, W. D., *The Myth of Open Spaces*.

First, the Commonwealth Government assumed virtual control of immigration in 1920. Before that, recruitment and the transport of migrants had been the responsibilities of the States, the Commonwealth virtually confining itself to such matters as advertising, exhibitions, and the preparation of handbooks. But after 1920 the Commonwealth undertook the task of recruiting the migrants in accordance with the estimated requirements of each State, the chief responsibility of the States being the after-care of the migrants. Second, under the terms of the Empire Settlement Act it was agreed that the Australian and British Governments should jointly pay assistance to approved settlers, a child under 12 years of age being carried free, juveniles aged 12-17 being assisted to the extent of £27 10s., and persons over 18 years with amounts varying from £16 10s. to £22. As we shall observe later, the recent agreements made with the British Government at the close of the war of 1939-45 continue this principle of joint financial responsibility.

Third, there was the now well-known "£34 Million Loan Agreement" of 1925, by which the Australian Government undertook to raise this amount by loans for large-scale developments that would tend directly or indirectly to increase the opportunities for the settlement of persons from the United Kingdom. The Australian Government was to spend £750,000 and the United Kingdom was to contribute £150,000 for every 10,000 emigrants from Britain, and 45,000 settlers were to be settled each year. To ascertain what development projects should be undertaken, the Australian Development and Migration Commission was constituted in 1926. This whole scheme was consistent with that spirit of optimism that pervaded the Empire after 1918. It was Australia's contribution to the grand plan for the redistribution of the white population of the Empire. But in practice the scheme never fulfilled expectations. Certainly an average annual intake of 24,000 immigrants was achieved between 1926 and 1929; but by the latter date it was apparent that many of the land-development schemes were not economic propositions. The depression finally wrecked the scheme, which had insecure foundations from the outset. Further, it was realized that large-scale rural group settlements, like those attempted in Victoria and Western Australia, were expensive and were not adding to Australia's industrial potential; and it is this which marks the difference between the schemes after 1918 and those after 1945. Closer land settlement is not the foundation of the new schemes of assisted migration. Migrants are required primarily for industrial, not for agricultural purposes.

Assisted migration virtually ceased after 1930 until 1937, when the Australian Government, in co-operation with the United Kingdom Government, decided to renew their agreements. Provision was made for the grant of assisted passages for British persons nominated by individuals or approved organisations in Australia; for migrants specially requisitioned by the State; and for other British persons who, if married, would be in possession of £300 capital on arrival in Australia, or who, if single, would have £50. This agreement did not indicate any return to the ambitious plans of 1922 and 1925. It merely marked the renewal of Australia's traditional policy of assistance, which was essential if the cost to the immigrant was to bear any resemblance to the cost of an unassisted passage to South Africa or Canada.

Indeed, pessimistic reports from British committees, which culminated in the final report of the Overseas Settlement Board in 1938, had practically destroyed the belief in the efficacy of the "men, money, markets", trilogy upon which supporters of earlier schemes had pinned their faith. The grandiose scheme for the redistribution of the population of what had become known since the Statute of Westminster as the British Commonwealth had ceased to function. More than that, redistribution had begun to operate in reverse, for in the thirties Australia was losing more people to, than she was gaining from, Britain.

This reversal of the traditional flow of people to the periphery did not, however, destroy the faith of Australians in the future of their country as a magnet for immigrants. What it did was rather to lead to a re-examination of the magnets within the country and to the acceptance of the view that it was no longer the vast open spaces, but the industrial development of Australia that would determine the rate of absorption of new people from overseas.<sup>3</sup> Until the outbreak of the war in 1939 estimates of the future absorptive capacity of Australia were extremely cautious. There was scope, some stated, for a moderate resumption of immigration with the lifting of the depression, but there should be no attempt to revive the "boa constrictor" type of immigration policy that in the past had meant bolting large quantities of people without adequate selection to ensure that they would be quickly absorbed into the economic

<sup>3</sup> An excellent study of the migration magnets of the twentieth century is W. D. Forsyth's *The Myth of Open Spaces*. Forsyth tends to accept too readily the thesis that Australia's "wide open spaces" are incapable of development of any sort, and as a result to minimize the problems they may pose for Australia in the future; but there can be little opposition to his main argument that white immigrants in the immediate future will be absorbed into areas already settled—and primarily into industrial occupations. True, much of Australia's open space appears to be useless at the moment, but Australia cannot afford to leave the matter there. Scientific surveys and research must be continued to ascertain if present opinion is justified, and wishful thinking about Australia's north should not be encouraged.

structure, with the result that many were regurgitated to swell the ranks of the unemployed or to return to their countries of origin.

In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1939 there had been a moderate revival of immigration without any extensive planning on the part of the Government. The net loss to Britain was reversed, while the net gain from non-British sources, which had continued during the depression, was extended. Between 1936 and 1940 there was a net gain of 42,000 European immigrants. Only 14,700 of these came from Britain, while 7300 came from Germany, 7600 from Italy, and 12,000 from other European countries. This extension of non-British immigration was partly the result of the Government's agreement in 1938 to admit 15,000 refugees over a period of three years, the persons to whom landing permits were granted being nominees of friends or relatives in Australia, or able to introduce at least £200 landing capital. Six thousand of these migrants had been received when the war broke out. In addition, an agreement was made with the Dutch Government to take a number of Netherlanders, while negotiations were also being conducted in Scandinavian countries. These schemes might have led to a moderate increase of population had the war not intervened, but they did not imply a revival of the "boa constrictor" principle of earlier years, and the majority of the migrants received no assistance. Of the net gain of 42,000 migrants between 1936 and 1940, only 3830 were assisted.

TABLE V  
NET IMMIGRATION, AUSTRALIA 1926-40

Period	Net Im- migration	Nominat- ed and Selected Persons <sup>4</sup>	Nationality and Race				
			British	French and Ger- man	Italian Greek and Yu- goslavs	Other Euro- pean	Non- Euro- pean
1926-30	129,707	99,405	105,220	1313	14,501	8354	-496
1931-35	-10,886	780	-10,390	239	1290	-431	-1540
1936-40	42,228	3830	14,665	7304	12,728	7039	900

We may well ask at this point if the post-war immigration plans mean a revival of the over-optimism of the twenties. In quantitative terms the post-war plans are certainly more ambitious than anything that has been attempted in the nation's history. The Empire settlement scheme of 1922 aimed at a moderate 45,000 a year, and achieved only 24,000 over a limited period. Now the target is put at

<sup>4</sup> Only nominated persons, and those selected by the Government under an approved scheme of the Empire Settlement Act, were entitled to passage assistance. The figures refer to the total intake, not net gains. The emigration of persons who had received assistance to enter the country is not classified in official statistics (see Appendix).

70,000 and the object is to continue this annual rate of increase until the population of Australia is at least doubled. But this ambitious project cannot be dismissed simply on the grounds that less ambitious schemes proved impracticable in the inter-war period. The post-war world is vastly different from even that which existed in 1939, and immigration has now to be considered in the context of the latter, and not of the former period. Only if we keep this in mind can we appraise the degree to which present plans are realistic.

Those plans represent essentially an attempt to take every British person who wishes to go to Australia, and to secure from European countries selected persons who can be assimilated to the Australian economic and social patterns. The British part of the plans is the result of negotiations between the British and Australian Governments during the war years, while the foundations of the European part were laid in the report of the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Committee of February 1946.

The Australian Government was encouraged to revive British Immigration when in September 1943 the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies declared that:

... having regard to the desirability, from the general point of view, of encouraging free movement within the British Commonwealth of people wishing for greater opportunities for self-development, the government support in principle the view expressed by the Overseas Settlement Board (in 1938) that no merely theoretical calculations as to the future consequences of such movements ought to stand in the way of migration of individuals. I can give the assurance that the Government are definitely in favour of assisting migration within the Empire.

Further statements by the Parliamentary Under-secretary (December 1943) and by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs (May 1944) also emphasized that it was not the Government's intention to place any obstacle in the way of inter-imperial migration. They were aware of the downward trend of fertility in Britain, but even so they felt that emigration should be encouraged. But the discussions that followed with the Governments of the Dominions made it clear that the only emigration that could be undertaken *immediately* after hostilities ceased would be that connected with the rehabilitation and resettlement of ex-servicemen. It was quite clear that no Dominion Government contemplated a return of the grandiose principles behind the 1922 Empire Settlement Act. Those days were gone and it was apparent that each Dominion Government was alive to the complex economic and social problems that must now accompany any large-scale scheme of assisted migration. Further, most Dominions felt that no scheme could be contemplated until

they had solved the problem of the rehabilitation of their own servicemen and women.<sup>5</sup>

But the Australian Government, more than that of any other Dominion, was looking further ahead than the immediate post-war years. The problems connected with rehabilitation were clearly recognized, as were those of housing and shipping; but might not the immigration of selected personnel, and perhaps even of firms complete with capital equipment and employees, tend to stimulate economic activity and so shorten and ease the period of readjustment from war to peace? These were questions that Government authorities in Australia were considering by 1945, and an indication of the Government's intentions in regard to immigration was provided in the Ministerial Statement of August of that year.<sup>6</sup>

This statement was a combination of optimism and of caution—optimism regarding the long-term absorptive capacity of Australia, and caution regarding the immediate prospects of securing the 70,000 settlers a year given as the "ceiling" if the total rate of population increase was to be kept within the manageable rate of 2 per cent per annum. It was considered that two years might elapse after the conclusion of hostilities before organized immigration could be revived on a large scale. During that period, however, the ground had to be prepared by overcoming three immediate problems: (i) the demobilization and re-employment of Australian service personnel, and the transfer to their normal occupations of those who had been temporarily transferred to war production; (ii) the lag in housing which had been accentuated by the war-time boom in marriages and the virtual cessation of building during the war; and (iii) the provision of adequate shipping to bring new citizens to Australia under reasonably comfortable conditions.

But it was not intended that in the interim no immigrants should be introduced to Australia. Plans had already been approved to bring 50,000 war orphans from Britain and other countries during the first three years after the war, and it was felt that this scheme should be put into operation as soon as shipping was available, since the entry of these children would create no economic difficulty. Secondly, persons resident in Australia who desired to bring their families out from Great Britain would be encouraged to do so. And thirdly, the Government was prepared to welcome the entry of a specified number of workers if it could be shown that similar workers could not be secured in Australia, and that their entry would create an expansion of the internal economy to provide useful employment

<sup>5</sup> See Cmd. 6658, 1945, *Immigration within the British Commonwealth*. Statement by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

<sup>6</sup> Commonwealth of Australia, Ministerial Statement on Immigration by A.A. Calwell, 2 August 1945.

for people who were already in, or who might later be introduced to the country. Meanwhile the Government was preparing to embark upon a publicity campaign in Britain and in other centres of potential immigration on the European continent, designed to explain to the people there Australia's anxiety to receive them on the one hand, and the causes of the delays that were inevitable on the other. By such measures it was hoped to inspire the intending migrant "with confidence in the bona fides of Australia and thereby increase his desire to take up life in this country". Meantime, negotiations were to be continued with the Government of the United Kingdom concerning free passages for ex-service personnel and assisted passages for civilians.

These negotiations resulted in an agreement between both Governments on 5 March 1946. Briefly, the main terms of the agreement were as follows:

(1) *The Free Passage Scheme for ex-service men and women:*

- (a) The Australian Government were prepared to accept British ex-service men and women, whenever demobilized, and their dependants, provided they were fit and otherwise approved by the Australian authorities as suitable for life in Australia.
- (b) The United Kingdom Government were prepared to grant free transportation to the port of disembarkation in Australia for approved men and women who had been resident in the British Isles or had been in the United Kingdom forces overseas on September 1, 1938, and had subsequently served in the armed forces or the merchant navy, and their dependants.
- (c) The Australian Government were to be responsible for the medical examination of applicants in the United Kingdom and for their after-care upon arrival in Australia.
- (d) Health and medical service benefits, maternity allowance and child endowment were to be extended to such migrants from the date of their arrival in Australia, and they were also to be eligible for sickness and unemployment benefits. (They were not eligible, however, for preference in employment under the terms of the Australian Soldiers' Preference Act.)
- (e) Applications for free passages were to be entertained if made within two years from the date of release from service, or two years from the date on which the scheme came into operation, whichever should be the later.

(2) *The Assisted Passage Agreement*

Under the Empire Settlement Acts of 1922 and 1937, whereby the Secretary of State was empowered to co-operate with the Government of a Dominion to carry out schemes of joint assistance it was agreed:

- (a) that migrants whose selection was approved by both Governments should be transported at a cost to the migrant of £10 in the case of each adult; £5 in the case of juveniles aged 14-19; and free in the case of children under the age of 14;
- (b) that the Governments of the United Kingdom and Australia should share equally the cost of transporting approved migrants to Australia, and that the costs incurred before embarkation should be met by the former Government and the costs of after-care in Australia by the latter;

(c) that no assistance should be given without the joint approval of the Commonwealth Government and the Secretary of State for the Dominions, and that no pamphlets explaining the scheme should be issued without the concurrence of both parties.

These two schemes, which came into operation on 31 March 1947, form the basis of Australia's post-war immigration policy, but while these negotiations with the United Kingdom Government were proceeding, the Commonwealth was also exploring the migrant possibilities of the European field. In his statement to the House of Representatives in August 1945 the Minister of Immigration had made it clear that the free and assisted passage scheme which was then being prepared was to be supplemented by a further project to introduce non-British people who "might make good Australian citizens". To explore the reserves of potential "good Australian citizens" an Immigration Advisory Committee had been established, with representatives of the Government and of both employer and employee organizations, and after an extensive tour of Britain and north-western Europe a detailed report on migration prospects was presented to the Minister in February 1946.<sup>7</sup>

Generally the tone of the Committee's report was one of restrained optimism. They found employer and employee organizations in Britain eager to co-operate on the question of migration to Australia, though some of the former stressed the deterrent of double taxation to the investment of capital in the Dominion—a matter soon to be amended by the Commonwealth Government. Concerning European migrants the Committee considered that with proper handling and selection many new settlers could be secured. In Switzerland they found many who desired to migrate to Australia. A great proportion of these were refugees from other areas, and they included men with technical skill and small manufacturers as well as rural workers and farmers. Holland was considered to offer good prospects for farmers with small capital and also for industrial workers. In Norway they saw prospects of a mass emigration provided facilities for transport and other assistance could be quickly offered. These appeared to the Committee to be the main areas of potential emigration, though they considered that a limited number might be secured from the refugees from Baltic countries, from Sweden, Denmark, and perhaps Belgium.

But the Committee was quite aware that it was surveying Europe at a time when the desire to emigrate was at a maximum. Either a slight economic recovery of Europe, or a continuation of the shipping difficulty beyond the end of 1946 would, they considered,

<sup>7</sup> Commonwealth of Australia, *Report of the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Committee*, 27 February 1946.

alter the whole situation and have a disastrous effect on proposed migration. Therefore, to try to hold the interest of the intending migrants in Europe, the Committee urged an extension of the machinery of publicity. Besides the usual media of newspapers, films, magazines, and lectures, they recommended an interchange of journalists between European countries and Australia, tours by migrants who had been in Australia for some time to tell their own people of their life in Australia, the visit by trade union representatives to Australia and an early conference in Australia of the International Labour Organization. But withal, they stressed, the information imparted must be strictly correct, and not aim at attracting people by presenting a glamour picture of the Commonwealth. Finally they felt that something might be done to hold intending migrants, until the bottleneck of shipping should be overcome, by the issue of landing permits valid for twelve months to selected persons.

In sum, what the Committee was recommending was a policy as vigorous as circumstances would permit, without reaching for the moon. It recommended neither indecent haste nor futile delay:

We cannot expect the best of both worlds. If we want migrants, Australia and Australians must do something vigorous about preparing to receive them . . .

Australia must approach the task, not in the leisurely manner of the "horse and buggy" day, but in the tempo of the atomic age. Not only the stereotyped public works, but great national works, should be pushed on with—not one at a time but concurrently so that the hammers and chisels of Australian progress can be heard in the remotest village of Europe. Then our call for men will be answered, and our destiny fulfilled.

Despite the panegyrics occasionally introduced, the fact remains that the Committee's report was an important contribution to an appreciation of Australia's contemporary problem of migration. Many of the difficulties that the Committee foresaw soon became only too obvious. During 1946 it became increasingly apparent that Australia could not transport more than a fraction of those seeking entry to the country, but there was little to indicate that the desire to emigrate was weakening by the end of 1946, as the Immigration Advisory Committee had suggested it might. The prospects of continued interest in Australia were indeed being sustained by the unexpectedly slow recovery of Britain and Europe after the war. By November 1946 63,700 inquiries, covering approximately 153,000 persons, had already been registered at Australia House, London,<sup>8</sup> while inquiries covering some 15,000 aliens, mostly

<sup>8</sup> See Commonwealth of Australia, Ministerial Statement on Immigration of 22 November 1946. This and the statement of 2 August 1945 provide an excellent short statement of the present Government's policy.

resident in Europe, had also been registered<sup>9</sup>. The enforced delay in transporting these people to Australia was not, however, without its advantages, for it provided a breathing space during which adequate machinery could be set up for the reception and assimilation of immigrants.

For this purpose a conference was opened on 19 August 1946 between Commonwealth and State Governments.<sup>10</sup> The Commonwealth accepted responsibility for the recruiting, medical examination, selection, and transportation of all British migrants brought out under the free and assisted passage schemes, and for placing them in employment. The State Governments, for their part, undertook the responsibility for their reception and after-care, the costs being met in equal measure by the Commonwealth and the States.<sup>11</sup> It was recognized that the success of the section of the migration policy relating to children would depend upon adequate after-care, and consequently this matter received particular attention at the conference. The States and the Commonwealth agreed that each should meet one-third of the capital expenditure by existing or new voluntary organizations for the accommodation of child and youth migrants, and this assistance was to be uniformly available to all religious and secular organizations wishing to participate in this scheme. Further, the States agreed to pay 3s. 6d. per week for each child migrant to the age of 14 years who was introduced by a voluntary organization, and would continue the payment to 16 years if the child was still at school. These contributions were to be subject to the payment by the Commonwealth of child endowment of 7s. 6d. per week, and to the United Kingdom Government continuing its weekly contribution of 5s. sterling (6s. 3d. Australian). Children thus introduced who are not to live under the care of their parents or relatives become the legal wards of the Minister of Immigration, who may delegate guardianship to State authorities; and suitable persons or representatives of any authority or organization may be granted the custody of evacuee and migrant children. Generally, the intention is that those who sponsor the admission of such children will be granted custody of them.<sup>12</sup>

9 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 August 1946.

10 The decisions of this conference are summarized in the Ministerial Statement of 22 November 1946.

11 In effect, however, the total cost is really met by the Commonwealth under the system of uniform taxation that now operates in Australia.

12 *Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act* 1946. The Government had originally planned to give the migration of children (war orphans) from Britain and Europe first priority while plans for adult migration were being laid. It had been hoped to introduce 50,000 such children during the first three post-war years. But difficulties immediately arose. No country was anxious to export its children, and most war orphans could be cared for at home by relatives or friends. Consequently it was agreed at the Conference of August 1946 that the war orphans scheme should be held in abeyance, to be reviewed later if practicable. The history of this section of the Government's post-war policy illustrates the danger of over-optimism in migration planning.

By the end of 1946 it was apparent that the scheme thus prepared could not absorb more than a proportion of those seeking entry to the country. Early in 1946 the quota for the year had been fixed at 35,000, but by the middle of the year inquiries had been registered for more than 100,000 intending immigrants. Consequently it was necessary to lay down a system of priorities for intending migrants under the free and assisted passage schemes. The main priorities approved by the Conference of August 1946 were (i) nominated migrants who could be accommodated by their nominators and who were classed as essential workers in Australian industry; (ii) nominated migrants who could be accommodated by their nominators and readily employed; (iii) children for existing organizations with accommodation for them (for example, farm schools); and (iv) nominated migrants, preferably single, who could not be accommodated by their nominators, but who could be classed as essential workers for Australian industry. Ten further categories were laid down covering migrants who were not nominated, the general scale of preference being similar to that given above for nominated immigrants, that is with the highest priority to single migrants with guarantee of ready employment, and the lowest to married men with no particular skill.

This Conference also completed the arrangement of the internal machinery for the reception and absorption of immigrants. The next problem was to decide how many could be absorbed. In December 1946 a nation-wide survey was completed and it was announced that in 1947 Australia could absorb 46,600 immigrants, including 5209 juvenile employees.<sup>13</sup> This represented upwards of 120,000 men, women and children when dependants were taken into account. The publication of this figure did little more than emphasize the considerable absorptive capacity of the Common-

13 The estimated labour requirements of each State were:

	Adult		Juvenile	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
New South Wales ..	8,835	4,420	455	1,430
Victoria ..	5,830	5,430	170	220
Queensland ..	4,500		850	320
South Australia ..	6,928	2,604	319	445
West Australia ..	1,197	863	—	—
Tasmania ..	805	70	—	—
Total (46,631):	28,035	13,387	1794	3415

The high adult male figure for South Australia bears witness to the "industrial revolution" now going on there. The large demand for female labour in the industrial states is also evidence of the shortage of women-power there in the lower paid occupations, for example, nurses, domestics. The demand for female juveniles is also interesting. The figures perhaps illustrate the tendency for industrial countries of high living standards to seek from other areas those who can relieve the native population of some of the drudgeries of life—a tendency very clear in the post-war plans of Britain and France. The danger is that such migration will encourage the perpetuation of "sweated" female labour in certain occupations.

wealth and its inability to secure anything approaching the required number. That shipping was likely to remain the chief difficulty in the operation of the scheme was revealed by the Australian High Commissioner at the close of 1946 when he said, "It is a physical impossibility for all the ships normally run by the shipping lines to lift anything approaching the ceiling figure of 70,000 or the estimated employment absorptive capacity for Australia of 46,000 for 1947."<sup>14</sup> Indeed the estimates of British shipowners of accommodation likely to be available in that year were as low as 9250.<sup>15</sup>

It was thus apparent that the inability to set the whole machinery in motion because of transport problems was outrunning the dead-line given by the Advisory Committee's report, which emphasized that if intending migrants were not lifted by the end of 1946 irreparable damage might be done to the long-term prospects of large-scale migration to Australia. Further, it was becoming apparent that other Dominions were also beginning to cast their nets to get their haul of British migrants. In January 1947 General Smuts told the South African Assembly that the Union urgently needed an immediate increase in its white population if it was not to run the risk of being overwhelmed by the coloured people.<sup>16</sup> Direct assistance was not contemplated, but loans recoverable over a period of years. The immediate target of the Union was 18,000 migrants a year.<sup>17</sup> Nor did the danger of competition end there. Canada was also entering the field, and was contemplating flying migrants from Britain if the ships were not available to lift them—a policy that was feasible for Canada, but hardly for remote Australia except at great public cost.

This was disturbing news for the planners of the Australian scheme, for even without direct assistance immigrants could be transported to Canada or South Africa at a comparatively cheap figure and in a comparatively short time. Australia's "bait" of assisted passages would provide no attraction if the intending migrants could not be moved for twelve months or more, for in the interim many would probably divert their attention to another Dominion. Further, for every ship Canada could provide Australia needed at least three of equal tonnage to lift the equivalent number of people. All the planning in 1946 had led only to a readjustment of population disturbed by war and to the demobilization of a few thousand

14 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 20 January 1947.

15 *Ibid.*

16 The *Cape Argus*, 29 January 1947. The danger of competition from the Union of South Africa was removed by the fall of the Smuts's Government.

17 The *Manchester Guardian*, 22 February 1947.

allied ex-servicemen in the Commonwealth. By November 1946 1000 American and 4500 British service personnel had applied for discharge or had been discharged in Australia.<sup>18</sup> But these had been offset by Australian wives of American and other servicemen going to settle abroad, and by the return of evacuees and others, mainly to the United Kingdom.

The delays and the uncertainty of the immediate future sent the Minister of Immigration on a world tour in July 1947. The first problem to which he devoted attention was shipping, but there was no immediate solution to be found. By July 1947 there were 200,000 British people registered at Australia House, London, but the estimate of berths available to Australia in every type of British ship, including first-class and other "non-migrant" accommodation, before 1951 was estimated at only 96,000. But despite these difficulties—or perhaps because of them—the Commonwealth Government was casting its net over a wider area to increase the migrant haul.

By June 1947 it had been agreed to offer financial assistance to approved Empire and Allied ex-servicemen and women who were "of pure European descent" and who were not eligible for free and assisted passages under the United Kingdom-Commonwealth Agreement which had come into operation in March 1947.<sup>19</sup> The section dealing with Empire ex-service personnel stated that the assistance should not be given normally to persons resident in a Dominion that was itself promoting emigration. The application of this section of the scheme was to be limited initially to the United States of America. Three aspects were emphasized—the applicant had to be of "pure European descent", to be personally suitable for settlement in Australia, and to be classed as an essential worker or readily employable. The intention was that migrants under this scheme should be restricted to occupations most urgently in need of manpower, those needs being determined on the basis of periodic surveys of occupational opportunities in the Commonwealth. The amount of passage assistance offered under this scheme was:

- (a) Forty per cent of the tourist class fare, or £30 sterling whichever is the lower, in the case of adults aged 19 and over.
- (b) Forty-five per cent of the fare or £32 10s. sterling, whichever is the lower in the case of children 14-18 years of age, and 50 per cent or £35 for children aged 12-13.
- (c) One hundred per cent of the fare, or £35 in the case of children under 12 born of an Australian father or mother, and half these amounts for other children under 12 years.

<sup>18</sup> Ministerial Statement, 22 November 1947, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> Details of this subsidiary scheme were kindly made available by the Department of Immigration.

This scale of payments was designed to keep the passage assistance within the limit of the amount payable by the Commonwealth under the United Kingdom-Commonwealth scheme. While it was likely that some migrants might be attracted under this scheme from some parts of the British Empire—for example, Malta—the most likely source of attraction was considered to be the United States of America. When the Minister visited the States in August 1947 he found that over two thousand Americans had sought passages to Australia under the subsidized scheme. But here again shipping proved the obstacle to the immediate operation of the scheme.

The Minister's sojourn abroad also brought about an extension of activities in Europe. Not only was the staff of the Migration Department at Australia House, London, considerably expanded, but preparations were made for the establishment of officers in Europe to supervise the selection of suitable types from the displaced persons. This constituted an attempt to widen the European organization, the nucleus of which was established in 1946 with the negotiations of the Australian Minister at the Hague with the Dutch Government for an assisted passage scheme, and with negotiations between the Commonwealth Immigration Department and the Swiss Consul-General.

But the most concrete development in 1947 in the planning for non-British settlers was the agreement between the Commonwealth Government and the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugees Organization on 21 July.<sup>20</sup> The Australian Government agreed to take four thousand settlers in 1947, and thereafter one thousand a month.<sup>21</sup> An important feature of this agreement was that heads of families were permitted to take with them all members of their immediate families, and other relatives dependent upon them. Those travelling alone were to be permitted to nominate their families for admission after three months' residence in the country. Thus this was essentially a family migration scheme—a fact which was much appreciated by the Preparatory Commission of the I.R.O. Indeed, that body referred to it as a "model which other governments might see fit to follow". For their part the I.R.O. undertook to provide shipping and to meet all costs incurred in the transport of the immigrants to Australia, while the Commonwealth Government agreed to make an *ex gratia* payment to the I.R.O.

<sup>20</sup> Details of the agreements with Australia and other countries are given in the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugees Organization, Public Information Office, *Monthly Digest*, number 2, October 1947.

<sup>21</sup> The Minister for Immigration has recently announced that the Commonwealth Government will increase this annual quota to 20,000 if shipping is available.

of £10 per migrant, which again illustrated the penalty Australia had to pay for her remoteness from the sources of migration, for this payment was intended merely to compensate the I.R.O. for the additional cost involved in sending immigrants to Australia compared with other countries. Finally, the migrants were to be provided with regular employment, and they for their part were required to remain in that employment for at least a year; they were to "enjoy exactly the same living conditions and wages as Australian workers performing similar work", and were to be "treated in exactly the same manner and without discrimination in the case of unemployment".<sup>22</sup>

Such then is Australia's post-war migration machinery, as it had been developed to the beginning of 1948. That machinery is more complex, more thorough and more ambitious than any previously attempted. Compared with previous schemes it is more complex because it aims at bringing into the country in large quantities not only workers in a single occupation, but a cross-section of all types required by the economy. It is more thorough because it aims at keeping the balance between the number seeking entry and the number that can be absorbed. And it is more ambitious because it aims at keeping the total rate of population growth at two per cent per annum until the present population is at least doubled. If the scheme functions as planned it cannot be classed as a return to the boa-constrictor days. Further, it recognizes more fully than did any previous scheme the importance not only of machinery for the proper after-care of the migrants, but also of social attitudes on the part of the Australians themselves. This point has been stressed in almost every official statement of policy. "We have been too prone in the past", said the Minister of Immigration recently, "to ostracize those of alien birth and then to blame them for segregating themselves and forming foreign communities. It is we, not they, who are generally responsible for this condition of affairs."<sup>23</sup>

But the problem of correct attitudes goes beyond that. The intending immigrant must also have information that is strictly correct, and not glamorized. The colour film has probably wrecked the lives of a number of earnest but misguided people. Consequently the Minister has taken steps to see that the information imparted through the Australian Information Office, which he also controls, should not attract applicants under false pretences. The official

22 P.C.I.R.O., *Monthly Digest*, number 2, October 1947. It should be noted, however, that Australian ex-servicemen are entitled to preference in employment over migrants, as over other Australians who have not served in the forces.

23 Ministerial Statement, 22 November 1946. Those of "alien birth" who were to be welcomed were presumably only those of "pure European descent".

attitude towards information is perhaps best summarized by the following statement concerning an official booklet that was being prepared in 1946 for publication:

The booklet, written in simple language, will give the alien an outline of our historical and cultural background, our social structure and mode of government, an appreciation of our way of life, and what Australia stands for as a nation. It will bring home to him the privileges and benefits which derive from Australian citizenship, and will better fit him to take his place in our great Commonwealth.

The tendency for national pride to infiltrate the best intentions of those claiming to be impartial can perhaps be detected, but it must be stressed that most of the information given from official sources to the intending immigrants has been pleasingly objective. No immigrant going to Australia, if he uses this literature discerningly, should have any illusions regarding income-tax scales, housing shortages and house rents, the cost of essential food and clothing, or wage rates. These facts are fairly given in a number of booklets.<sup>24</sup> Where he may be led astray is by interpreting the lower priced articles, for example, working clothes, as typical of middle class standards. Thus while it is true that a worsted suit can be bought for £5 16s. 6d., the migrant may be compelled to pay double that price because he prefers a better quality article, or simply because the cheaper suit is not available as the result of shortages in material. Or again, it may not be the price schedules, but the cover design of Bondi in brilliant sunshine or of boating on Sydney harbour that may appeal, the intending immigrant not realizing that the same climate that encourages open-air aquatic sports also makes a working day exhausting. But such misinterpretations as these will occur in any publicity which of necessity can only give a "segmentized" picture of Australia, and it is to the credit of the Department of Immigration and Information that the intention of their policy in regard to immigration has been to avoid the propagandist tendency that accompanied most past policies.<sup>25</sup>

24 For example, see the Australian News and Information Bureau, *Australia and Your Future* (October 1946) and *Know Australia* (August 1946).

25 As a result of the persistence of those difficulties which have prevented the immigrant target being reached, there has been a tendency recently for some supporters of immigration to use their imaginations a little too freely. Britain is seen as a country verging on starvation and Australia as God's own country. But generally there remains a pleasing lack of that unintentional fabrication which frequently accompanies a migration scheme (see Chapter IV, footnote 10).

## CHAPTER IV

### THE UNITED KINGDOM AND AUSTRALIA— COMPETITORS OR PARTNERS?

UNTIL the outbreak of the second World War the peopling of Australia was a comparatively simple matter. Both the size of the population today (7,400,000) and its homogeneity are in fact largely the result of fortuitous circumstances. Australia was claimed as British territory in time to benefit from the extraordinary expansion of the British people in the nineteenth century. That vast voluntary movement from the British Isles was caused primarily by economic factors—the relative over-population of Britain on the one hand and the relative under-population of the colonies on the other. Further, at no period in the nineteenth century did that movement threaten to decrease Britain's population, because a consistently high birth-rate and a falling mortality kept the supply of new people in excess of the volume of emigrants. And finally, the exodus suited the economic requirements of both Britain and the colonies. The latter required people with strong arms and sinews rather than those with capital or a high degree of technical skill, and these were the people whom Britain could most readily spare without damaging her own economic structure.

But what of the position today? This question can best be discussed in two parts, the demographic and the economic.

The demographic aspects need not be discussed here in any detail, because the fact of the decline in the birth-rate of Britain and western Europe is well known. Before the outbreak of the recent war many students of migration were arguing that, as a result of that decline in fertility, the great exodus of people from Britain and Europe to lands of the New World was over. The peak of that exodus occurred in the nineteenth century, when almost sixty million people—eighteen million of them from the British Isles—moved overseas. It was one of the greatest emigrant movements in history. From the loins of these European migrants have sprung, in three centuries, a powerful American nation of one hundred and forty million people and four British Dominions with a total population of some twenty-three million. But when the rate

of population growth in the metropolitan countries began to decrease, it became apparent that they could not afford to continue indefinitely to feed those oversea territories.

The significance of the downward trend of the birth-rate for the British Dominions was first realized by British authorities, who gave warnings of "the drying reservoir of British migrants" to representatives of the Dominions at almost every Imperial conference between 1911 and 1939. Expert committees set up by the British Government between 1931 and 1934 to examine the effect of continued migration upon the parent country stressed the fact that Britain could not continue much longer to export both people and goods. The final and most abrupt warning to the Dominions came in 1938 when the British Overseas Settlement Board stated in its final report that the era of mass migration from the British Isles was virtually over, and that if the Dominions still wanted new settlers they should seek them from non-British countries. The Dominions, however, were slow to heed the warning and continued to look first to Britain for migrants. A clash between the Dominions and the Mother Country on this subject was temporarily prevented by the onset of economic depression after 1930, which reduced the absorptive capacity of the latter to a negligible quantity, but with the revival of economic conditions after 1936, Dominion hopes were again raised. Hence the warning of the Overseas Settlement Board in 1938.

Why this British opposition? The main evidence that led the Board to come down heavily against emigration was a detailed analysis of the population structure of the United Kingdom. In short, the declining British birth-rate had created a situation similar to that in Australia. The only difference was that the decline in fertility had been more severe in Britain than in Australia. A decline in the total population of the United Kingdom was foreseen if fertility was not raised much above pre-depression levels—and, more important, the decline would first be felt amongst the breadwinning age-groups. Here, for example, is a projection of the state of the British population that would result from a continuation of fertility trends at 1938 levels (figures in millions):<sup>1</sup>

Age-group	1941	1951	1961
15-30	11.1	9.9	8.8
30-45	10.9	11.0	10.2
45-65	10.7	12.1	13.3
15-65	32.7	33.0	32.3
Over 65	4.3	5.5	6.5

<sup>1</sup> Cmd. 6358, 1942, *Current Trend of Population in Great Britain*.

These figures may be compared with our earlier projection for Australia. They are in all respects similar—a decline in young wage-earners, an increase in the older wage-earning groups, and a more rapid increase in the aged dependant section. What the British authorities feared was that emigration, which is a highly selective movement taking the younger and most active section of the working age-groups, would accentuate the ageing tendency of the British population, and leave Britain with an inadequate supply of the type of manpower necessary to maintain the level of production.

Now these pre-war fears of the demographic consequences of large-scale emigration have been repeated in the post-war world. Also more than 400,000 people have inquired at Australia House about emigration to this Dominion. Thousands have also inquired about South Africa, Canada, and New Zealand. Yet the present British Government has given no overt sign of opposition to their exodus. On the contrary they have stated on numerous occasions that they still recognize the "obligation" of the Mother Country to supply additional people for the development of the Dominions, which are all desperately short of manpower as a result of the impetus given to their industries during the war years. We have already referred to the statements made between 1943 and 1945 by Government representatives in both the Lords and the Commons to Britain's obligation to the Dominions in this matter. It is significant, too, that the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Committee, during its inquiries in Britain in 1945, found the trade unions in Britain favourably disposed to emigration.

A close examination of these war-time and post-war statements in Britain favourable to emigration reveals a curious mixture of demographic realism and imperial sentiment. Almost every pronouncement has been prefaced by reference to the demographic pattern of Britain. They admit that population growth in Britain has almost ceased and, indeed, that even without emigration the numbers may soon decline. The reduction in the number of young people entering industry, which must occur in the absence of *immigration* as a result of the rapid fall in the birth-rate after 1930, is usually stressed. But, they continue, Britain still has an obligation to the Dominions, which are still underpopulated, and the redistribution of the population within the whole British Commonwealth would increase the strength of the whole organization, particularly from the point of view of defence.

We may well ask: Are these statements realistic? Is there any longer any reason to believe that Britain can still continue to release

people to the Dominions without irreparably damaging her economic structure? On the face of it, the present Government appears to think she can. Probably it is influenced here by two factors. First, it is reluctant to impose any barrier to the free movement of British people. Such a move would be taken as an interference with a fundamental liberty. It should not, of course, be inferred from the existing policy of *assistance* that Britain is prepared to *promote* general emigration; but the assistance provided for both ex-service personnel and civilians (See p. 21 above) is consistent with previous policy—for example the Empire Settlement Acts of 1922 and 1937—and also with the British tradition of individual liberty. Adherence to this principle of freedom of movement in a world in which so many individual liberties are being challenged or suppressed is doubtless yet another sign of the virility of British democracy, but while the Government has been reluctant to interfere with the freedom of the individual to emigrate overseas, it has nevertheless seen fit to re-introduce manpower controls that may be used—though in fact they have not been used at all extensively—to restrict the individual's right to migrate, or to compel him to migrate, within the country from one place of employment to another. Further, manpower control is but one of a number of admissions that Britain is (June, 1948) desperately short of workers in relation to her reconstruction plans.

Second, it may be that some potential opposition to emigration was quelled by the publication of recent figures of Britain's birth-rate. In 1939 live births in England and Wales totalled only 619,352 compared with 820,268 in 1946. During this period the crude birth-rate rose from 14.9 to 19.1 per 1000 of population, and the net reproduction rate from 0.81 to 1.1. In 1947 the situation appeared to have improved still further, for the birth-rate during the first three-quarters of the year was over 20 per 1000, and the number of births recorded was higher than at any similar period since 1920.<sup>2</sup> It is, of course, too early to say whether this rising birth-rate will result in an increase in the size of the families which will be completed from marriages contracted since 1939. So far this rise can be attributed partly to the war-time increase in marriages. The marriage rate of England and Wales rose from 7.9 in 1933 to 10.7 in 1938 and then to 11.3 in 1940, which was the highest figure ever recorded, and the war-time rise in the birth-rate has been essentially due to early-order births arising from these marriages and to later-order births from marriages contracted during the years of economic depression, in which later children were

<sup>2</sup> Registrar General, Quarterly Return, October 1947, no. 395.

temporarily postponed for economic reasons. The war-time rise in births therefore does not provide any grounds for assuming that completed family size in England is increasing, although it may indicate that the long-term fall has been checked. In any case, the effects of recent fertility changes cannot alter the economic consequences of past demographic trends for approximately fifteen years.

Have we not here, then, a fundamental conflict of interests arising out of the demographic and economic situation of the Dominions on the one hand, and of Britain on the other? There are many in Britain who would answer in the affirmative—and indeed the present Government may be finding it easy to shelve a decision between liberty and economic well-being because the bottlenecks of shipping and housing shortages in the Dominions are still preventing the mass exodus of people. But the overt opposition to Labour's connivance regarding emigration has come essentially from non-Labour circles. In August 1947 Mr Churchill, in one of his back-to-the-wall speeches, urged Britons not "to desert the old land", but "to stay and fight".<sup>3</sup> There were others who had made similar appeals against the resumption of emigration. In August 1946 a pertinent comment in the *Economist*<sup>4</sup> had pointed out that the departure of every young worker represented fifteen or twenty years heavy capital investment in education, housing, medical services, and training, and that to permit these valuable assets to vanish at the very moment when they could make a return was an extremely expensive policy. Also in view of the contemporary demographic structure of Britain, it would leave the country with a preponderance of the old and a surplus of fixed capital that would become well-nigh insupportable. It further suggested that it would not be unreasonable for the British Government to insist that those countries seeking young workers should also take a proportion of aged dependants in order to relieve Britain of *some of the added burden that emigration would otherwise force her workers to carry*.

These conflicting opinions encourage further analysis of the problem. Is there a fundamental disharmony between the long-term interest of Britain and Australia in regard to migration? This leads us to the relation between the demographic patterns of Australia and Britain and to economic developments.

From the point of view of population density, Britain, with her 703 people to the square mile—compared with less than 3 in Australia—is still the "tight little isle", and it is quite clear that the

<sup>3</sup> *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 August 1947.

<sup>4</sup> 17 August 1946.

war, because of its drastic effects upon her economic organization, has increased the relative "tightness". Superficially, there seems every reason to agree with C. E. M. Joad, who looks forward to the day when Britain's population will be reduced to five million. But is this approach really sound?

For the purpose of our discussion we shall not anticipate this drastic reduction—about ninety per cent—of the population of the United Kingdom. This is not likely to occur in the measurable future. Rather let us assume that it is possible that emigration and controlled fertility may reduce the population from the present level of 48 million to, say, 30 or 35 million over the next thirty years. This reduction would appear possible, for it could be achieved by an average exodus of 200,000 people a year and the maintenance of fertility and mortality at the levels prevailing in 1939.

Now whether or not such a reduction in population would be desirable is extremely difficult to determine. If economic factors alone are taken into account the conclusions reached may be very different from those derived from a consideration of, say, only strategic factors. If an appraisal is to be realistic, both of these, and a number of other factors besides—for example, imperial obligations, and the place of the United Kingdom in British Commonwealth affairs—must also be taken into account. But we may assume, without anticipating serious opposition, that the maintenance of the United Kingdom as a strong world power is desirable, if only as a bulwark of political democracy, and of a way of life cherished by the English-speaking world and by a considerable part of western Europe. If this is granted, it is axiomatic that the economic well-being of the United Kingdom must also be maintained.

Before the war of 1939-45 there was, as we have seen, considerable caution regarding large-scale emigration from Britain. Indeed, many British writers on population questions feared the economic consequences of the declining birth-rate. Others thought that planned economic adjustment could successfully cope with the problems that would arise when the population ceased to grow.<sup>5</sup> Few, even at the height of the depression, were prepared to advocate emigration as a cure for economic disorders—and in this they were right, because the level of unemployment in Britain in the thirties had little to do with the advent of a stationary population, whereas the rapidity of recovery after depression would depend considerably upon the level of available manpower and of exports.

<sup>5</sup> For a contrast in economic opinion on the subject of the consequences of population decline see Harrod, R. F., "Modern Population Problems", and Jewkes, J., "The Population Scare", *The Manchester School*, vol. X, numbers 1 and 2, 1939.

Nor was there any need to fear that without assistance to emigrate Britain would lose population. In the early thirties emigration was virtually blocked by the low absorptive capacity of countries outside Britain, and it was significant that with the return to relative prosperity after 1936—and even before this—it was industrial Britain that proved more attractive in a system of voluntary migration than the Dominions. Nearly half the net increase of the population of England and Wales between 1931 and 1938 was due to immigration.<sup>6</sup>

Now the post-war situation of Britain is vastly different from the pre-war. In the first place there is virtually no unemployment apart from the temporary structural unemployment that must be the inevitable accompaniment of the transfer of an economy involving more than twenty million workers from organization for total war to a peace-time basis. Secondly, in relation to the economic structure Britain is preparing as the essential basis of the survival of the nation at decent standards of life, there is a serious shortage of manpower. Indeed, so keen is the demand for labour that the United Kingdom Government is actively engaged in an *immigration* programme designed to attract displaced persons from Europe and other workers from Germany and Italy. At a European manpower conference held in Rome in February 1948 it was reported that Britain had already absorbed 110,000 foreign workers, including Poles of the Resettlement Corps, during the previous six months, and that she could probably absorb a further 100,000 skilled workers during 1948<sup>7</sup>. Thus for 1947 Britain stood as the country of the British Commonwealth with the most successful immigration policy, and unless the British economy suffers a set-back there will be no surplus manpower in Britain in the measurable future.

The reason for this industrial impetus is not difficult to find, for production for export has become the very basis of the people's bread and butter. It is true that before the war Britain also lived by her exports, but important in the economy were the net earnings from "invisibles", which in 1938 yielded £232,000,000, or sufficient to pay for over a quarter of the imports in that year.<sup>8</sup> These have now gone, and a reasonable standard of living can now be maintained only by an expansion of exports much beyond the pre-war level, the required volume being substantially increased by the rapid rise in prices of essential imports, which in 1948 was largely the result of the failure of European crops in the summer of 1947. This,

6 See Walshaw, R. S., *Migration to and from the British Isles: Problems and Policies* (London, 1941).

7 *The Times*, 2 October 1948 (Report of the European Manpower Conference held in Rome).

8 Cmd. 7344, 1948, *Economic Survey for 1948*.

briefly, is Britain's post-war economic problem, and that the problem is by no means solved is clearly revealed in two White Papers—the United Kingdom Balance of Payments, 1946 and 1947, and the Economic Survey for 1948. As these point out, Britain was able to lay the basis of her post-war recovery only with United States and Canadian credits, together with other temporary borrowings. Now Britain is preparing to pay her way, but only with assistance from Marshall aid. Without this the British see no hope "of recovering equilibrium at a reasonable standard of life within the next few years".<sup>9</sup> Finally, it is useless to argue that Britain's need for industrial manpower could be reduced if she increased the output of agriculture. The latter is not so much a problem of increased manpower as of the increased import of feeding stuffs essential to the expansion of livestock. The expansion of agriculture can only be considered in relation to the capacity of the export drive to pay for these essential imports.

What, then, is the relation of this situation to emigration? If the plans outlined in the Economic Survey are to be carried through Britain will need every industrial worker she possesses, and more besides. But their success also depends upon Britain's capacity to increase her exports to non-dollar areas, and upon the maintenance of reasonable price stability in those areas from which she purchases the essential imports of raw materials and foodstuffs.

It is perhaps the delicacy of this balance that has led well-wishers of Britain to offer to solve her economic plight by mass emigration. The Minister of Immigration for Australia, for example, has stated on more than one occasion that it would be better for the 600,000 Britons who have expressed a desire to go to the Dominions to be lifted at once, rather than to remain in the United Kingdom "under very severe, almost semi-starvation conditions", and thereby to be permitted to enjoy "the fuller, better life somewhere else inside the British Commonwealth of Nations".<sup>10</sup> But it should not be too readily assumed that the Briton is living today in almost semi-starvation. Health statistics, infant mortality statistics, and food budgets show that the majority of the wage earners have been better off in the post-war years than at almost any time between the two wars. And unless the present plans of the British Government go awry the standard of living of the British worker will not deteriorate. From the economic point of view, however, will

9 *Ibid.* p. 54.

10 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 August 1947. This is an example of the tendency to unrealistic optimism and over-simplification of problems that has become increasingly apparent in recent statements regarding migration to Australia.

emigration help Britain to surmount the crisis and to improve the standards of life of those who remain?

Voluntary emigration is not likely to do so, for it has always been, and is likely to remain a highly selective process. For example, the Dominions Royal Commission pointed out in 1917 that in the fourteen years before 1914 65 per cent of the male emigrants over 12 years of age were between the ages of 18 and 30. That a heavy reduction of the population of this age would be of little help to Britain is now widely recognized. It would merely increase the proportion of population dependent upon the work of the bread-winning age groups; it would not reduce the dependence of Britain upon exports; and it might well, because of its deleterious effect upon the adaptability of the labour force, further reduce Britain's capacity to pay for essential imports, and thereby lower the standards of life of those who remain.

Several suggestions have been made for adjusting the migration scheme so as to avoid this. For example, it has been suggested that the Dominions should take a cross-section of the population so that every thousand emigrant workers should be accompanied by an average proportion of aged dependants.<sup>11</sup>

The problem here, of course, is that the mobile sections of any community are the young and virile. Those who have finished their life's work do not readily move to a new land because it is economically desirable for the nation that they should do so. Further, any attempt to encourage these people to move in the evening of their lives beyond the circle of acquaintances amongst whom they have toiled would be unjust. This may be called one of the emotional aspects of emigration, but its importance is not to be minimized.

A solution to the problem could perhaps be found by the Dominions concerned returning to the United Kingdom the proportion of the social service contribution for the aged that would normally have been paid by the emigrants to each Dominion. In this way the United Kingdom would be compensated for the loss of her breadwinners and the Dominions would be paying only a nominal price for the advantage they had gained through selective migration.

But the problem does not end there. Emigration from Britain to the Dominions could perhaps be simply arranged in a manner that would soften the economic consequences to the parent country, were it not for the fact that Britain is now a debtor nation. Receipts from interest, profits, and dividends have been greatly reduced. "Invisibles" have gone temporarily, with no immediate prospect

<sup>11</sup> For example, the *Economist*, op. cit.

of renewal. Against these must now be set heavy additional obligations for payments of interest and repayment of loans, which may for a number of years offset any reduction the Government is able to make in its expenditure. These commitments can in fact be met only by raising exports. If emigration could be undertaken in such a way as to permit Britain to attain her export target of 1948, that is, half the 1938 volume, but at the same time to reduce the volume of imports, a net advantage would follow. But selective emigration will, in the demographic position in which Britain is situated, reduce the volume of goods for export by at least as much as, and almost certainly by more than, it will reduce the requirements for imports, unless that emigration is offset by developments in technical efficiency. But this is just what Britain cannot achieve at the moment. The increase in her output in the immediate future must come essentially from increased output per worker, not per machine. The renewal of much of Britain's capital equipment can only be afforded *after* the dependence on exports has been reduced. It was essentially the recognition of this problem that forced the Government to curtail the estimates for capital expenditure for 1948,<sup>12</sup> which means that equipment will be renewed only where such a step is proved to be essential to increase the level of exports.

There is one further type of emigration which can be of advantage to Britain—the transfer of whole factories that can reduce the dependence of the Dominions upon the dollar market. For example, the manufacture in Australia of cotton textiles would allow Australia to dispense with imports from America, and would thereby be as effective for Britain in conserving dollars as direct exports from Britain to America. But the extent of such emigration would be limited.

It would not be unreasonable, therefore, for those Dominions which take British migrants to take over also a proportionate share of the national debt and of social service contributions. This would mean, in effect, each Dominion would be buying its proportion of voluntary migrants from Britain. Unless compensated in this manner it is difficult to see how Britain can stand to gain in the future by selective emigration. Britain's recovery could, and probably would, be facilitated if any emigration scheme were qualified as we have suggested, but at the moment there seems a danger that Britain will be drained of some of her life-blood by her lusty Dominions without receiving the necessary transfusions to keep her alive.

But even if the Dominion policies reach their target it appears that Britain may temporarily compensate herself by an intake of

<sup>12</sup> Cmd. 7268, 1948, *Capital Investment in 1948*.

immigrants from Europe along the lines we have indicated above. For the first time in centuries Britain is planning to become an *immigrant* country, competing with France in the European market. Textile workers, miners, agricultural workers, domestic servants, and nurses are being drawn to Britain, while thousands of British in similar occupations go overseas to Canada, South Africa, and Australia. This reshuffling may be a good thing in the interests of international amity. The domestic servant from Germany may be "democratized" in the British middle-class home, or the textile worker from a displaced persons' camp in Europe may be given new hope in life; but if these people are assimilable to the British way of life many of them could be assimilated to the Australian or Canadian way of life, and would it therefore not be streamlining the migrant scheme for the Dominions to give more direct attention themselves to Europe and less to Britain? The situation is extremely interesting, for Britain is seeking to repair the gaps in her population by stock which the Dominions have, implicitly if not explicitly, considered to be inferior, and it is not unlikely that in a generation Australia and the other Dominions will be happily taking "pure British" migrants sprung from parents of whom one at least will have come from any area ranging from Poland to Italy. A suitable stamp for their passports might be, "Manufactured in Britain for export from raw material from Europe."

On the other hand, however, the steady influx in the immediate future of a million or more immigrants from Europe into the United Kingdom may serve a useful purpose in spreading the knowledge of political democracy, besides keeping the industrial wheels turning, and this is an aspect of immigration that should not be ignored in the present phase of rival ideologies. These immigrants would remain in closer contact with their countries of origin if settled in the United Kingdom than if they were removed to a distant outpost of the New World.

Summing up our discussion of the prospects of British emigration, we may say that from both the demographic and economic points of view it is difficult to see how Britain can remain a large exporter of people, so long as the ambition of the British leaders and people is to recapture a dominant place in the world as an industrial nation. Should the present economic goals not be reached and should the world conditions stultify Britain's export drive, with its consequent effects upon essential imports, then Britain will become over-populated, and a mass movement from Britain would appear to be advantageous, provided that movement can be controlled so as to minimize its selective tendency and to leave Britain with a sufficient

proportion of breadwinners in relation to her total population. But it is probable that in the immediate future there will be a considerable short-term exodus of people from Britain to Australia and the other Dominions, which may pass the million mark. The British Government is encouraging this movement by its share in free passage schemes now being offered to ex-service personnel. It feels morally bound to continue this assistance for approximately two years as the Government's contribution to those who served in the recent war, either in the armed services or in the merchant navy. Nor is it likely that the British Government will place any barrier in the way of assisted or free emigrants. Rather will it try to replace those losses by an extension of the plan to secure immigrants from Europe.

Let us now turn to the "pull" that Australia may exert on intending British emigrants.

We have shown in the previous chapter that there is little doubt that the Commonwealth has a considerable absorptive capacity, and there are indications that this capacity has increased rather than diminished since the war ended. The estimated labour shortage, which was placed at 47,000 at the close of 1946,<sup>13</sup> had increased by several hundred per cent by 1948. In March of that year it was reported that more than 100,000 workers, including 30,000 juveniles, were needed in New South Wales alone, and that Australia, as a whole, was short of 100,000 *skilled workers*.<sup>14</sup> So confident is the Commonwealth Government in the country's capacity to absorb the optimum rate of growth of 2 per cent per annum that the target for 1948 has been put at the maximum level of 70,000. This is more than double the target for 1947, and six and a half times greater than the net immigration for 1947.

In 1947 the migration results were not, at first sight, particularly striking. The net gain through immigration was only 11,661 persons, though during the year the permanent arrivals in Australia totalled 31,950 (16,775 males and 15,175 females). Permanent departures totalled 20,289. Approximately two-thirds of these permanent arrivals were British, the remainder including some 1100 Americans, 1500 Poles, and 1400 Greeks, the first shipment of 843 refugees under the agreement with the I.R.O., and 6400 persons from other sources.

The second post-war year of 1947 must be considered essentially as an interim period of adjustment following the war. Neither the entry of 32,000 immigrants nor the exodus of 20,000 provided any real clue to the prospects of the longer term success of Australia's

<sup>13</sup> See Chapter III, footnote 13.

<sup>14</sup> Australian News and Information Bureau, *Australian News*, 23 March 1948.

migration scheme, for a considerable proportion of this movement was either the rehabilitation of families whose normal life had been disrupted during the war, or the result of war-time marriages of which one partner was an Australian. Any lesson which the migratory movement of 1947 may have had for later developments can best be gauged by considering the relative success that attended the assisted entry of such a group as the 200 building labourers—representing the first instalment of the 1000 it was intended to introduce—who were imported to Canberra early in the year. These men were housed in temporary barracks in Canberra under conditions that were congenial enough, but the subsequent departure from the Federal Capital of about half these men is a warning of some of the problems that may arise in the future. It is true that the majority who left Canberra moved to other parts of the country, and particularly to Sydney and Melbourne, and so did not leave Australian shores, but their internal movement illustrates the difficulty of introducing immigrants to undertake specific work in a specific place. Australia is not Britain; the environment is frequently not readily acceptable to the migrant, and his future happiness as an "assimilated" Australian may require considerable movement, either from one place to another, or from one occupation to another. A sympathetic understanding by Australians of the problems facing the immigrant will minimize the need for such mobility, but it cannot eliminate it.<sup>15</sup>

An indication of the optimum movement from Britain to Australia that was reasonably to be expected in 1948 may be gauged from three factors: first, the acute labour shortage in Australia; second, the fact that over 400,000 people were still registered at Australia House; and third, the quantity of shipping that was then available. In regard to the last factor, the situation was immeasurably better than it was in 1947. By the end of the year there were some twenty-two passenger ships on the United Kingdom-Australia run, of which ten were to be used exclusively for the carriage of immigrants. In February 1948, departures from the United Kingdom averaged 2500 a month, and it was anticipated that by the close of the year 30,000 free and assisted passage immigrants would have been transported, together with 20,000 full-fare paying passengers.<sup>16</sup> The balance of 20,000 to reach the target of 70,000 was expected to be gleaned from European countries, from America, and from displaced persons' camps in the United States and British Zones of occupied

<sup>15</sup> These social and psychological aspects of assimilation are discussed more fully in Chapter VII.

<sup>16</sup> By May, 1948, emigrants were being listed from Britain at a rate sufficient to reach this target.

In the first nine months of 1948, 44,600 permanent arrivals arrived in Australia. Of these 30,900 were British. This success and the improvement in shipping has since caused the Government to raise the "target" for 1949 to 140,000, or twice the original figure.

Europe. Three-quarters of the 12,000 refugees whose entry in 1948 was agreed upon under the terms of the contract with the I.R.O. were expected by July, and if further shipping was available the Government was prepared to consider raising the annual quota from 12,000 to 20,000.<sup>17</sup>

British immigrants are thus still to be the major plank in the migration platform, and they are to be recruited under the priorities already stated. The majority are to be picked to fit into occupations for which labour is short in Australia, and which are considered to be essential to the development of the nation's economy. High priority is therefore likely to be given to carpenters, electrical and mechanical fitters, motor mechanics, and textile workers, signifying the expected industrial revolution of Australia. But the selection does not end there, for Australia is as short—and in some occupations shorter—of an adequate supply of police cadets, nurses, and domestic workers, as is Britain. Further, she still requires what may be termed large-scale pioneer gangs for railway and road development in sparsely settled areas. To help to meet this problem, two hundred Yugo-Slavs reached Melbourne early in 1948 to start work relaying sections of the trans-Australian railway—the first step towards obliterating the ghastly monument to colonial jealousy that might well have crippled Australia's defence power had the Japanese not been turned back in the battles of New Guinea and the Coral Sea. The Victorian Minister for Transport has also advocated the transfer of one thousand British railway workers to that State, together with prefabricated houses to accommodate them.<sup>18</sup>

This brief survey of the occupational requirements of Australia and the shipping facilities available in 1948 is sufficient to indicate the extent to which the immigration plans of this country are entering into competition with the British labour market, for many of the types being sought here are those required for the reconstruction and expansion of the British economic life. Further, the types of immigrants Australia is seeking are also broadly the types Canada and New Zealand are seeking; and although the drain on the British labour market might not be serious if Australia were the only Dominion seeking skilled workers, the fact that others are also seeking similar types will tend to create serious gaps in Britain's labour force.

If there is a conflict of interests at the national level between Britain as an emigrant country and Australia as an immigrant

17 *Australian News*, 15 March 1948.

18 *Ibid.* 23 March. It is relevant to note here that the "target" for non-British immigrants in 1949 is now approximately 70,000. Many of these may be bound to undertake manual work for two years as a condition of their entry.

country, will individuals nevertheless benefit economically by emigration? This question is difficult to answer, because of inadequate figures. Generalizing, however, we may conclude that Australia offers some economic advantages to some classes and some disadvantages to others. It can safely be said that the manual workers of both Australia and Britain have been better off in the post-war years than pre-war. There has been virtually full employment, and wage rates have been adjusted to meet the increased prices of essential commodities. In Australia the cost of living index rose by approximately one-third. In Britain the index of the Ministry of Labour rose from 100 in 1938 to 129 in 1944, but it is probably that the effective rise was nearer 40 per cent.<sup>19</sup> Wages of similar industries in the two countries since the war ended are difficult to compare. In Australia in 1943 the total earnings of adult males engaged in the manufacturing industries averaged A£6 15s. per week,<sup>20</sup> that is, approximately £5 8s. sterling. This may be compared with the gross earnings in 1945 of British workers in the textile trade (£5 4s. 7d.), clothing (£5 16s. 8d.) and Transport (£5 14s. 10d.).<sup>21</sup> The general increase in Australian wage rates since 1943 has probably given them a slight lead over British workers, but more significant than the total earnings are what they will buy.

Here again we can give only rough approximations. A handbook of the Commonwealth Department of Immigration and Information of October 1946<sup>22</sup> estimated that the basic-wage earner with his wife and family of three children would receive A£5 15s., or £4 12s. sterling. Out of this food, it was stated, might cost 40s. to 42s. or 32s. to 34s. sterling. A similar estimate of a human needs diet for a family of five in Britain at 1945 prices was 36s. 6d.-37s. 1d. sterling. Thus on balance the Australian worker may gain a little on the food budget. But he will probably lose on housing, for the estimated weekly rental of a wooden house in 1946 in Australia was 16s. to 20s. sterling, whereas he would probably have left a home in Britain at a weekly rental of 8s. to 12s. Although Government housing plans in Australia now include a system of rent rebates, the majority of immigrants in the immediate future will not find it possible to benefit under this scheme. The majority will have to live, for some years at least, in houses let by private owners. Thus on balance the immigrant in the relatively low income occupations will not gain any economic advantage in Australia as far as the two basic items of food and house room are concerned.

19 Oxford University Institute of Statistics, *Studies in War Economics* (Oxford, 1947), Chapter IV.

20 Australian News and Information Bureau, *Australia and Your Future*, p. 8. 1946

21 Oxford University Institute of Statistics, *Studies in War Economics*.

22 *Australia and Your Future*, p. 8. *et seq.*

But other factors must also be taken into account. Both Britain and Australia are developing comprehensive social security schemes which add to the real income of the worker. In both countries in 1948 child endowment was available for all children after the first at the rate of approximately 8s. sterling (10s.A.) in Australia and 5s. sterling in Britain. Any advantage that Australia could offer here was offset by the more extensive benefits in kind which were available in Britain, where every child could secure school meals for the nominal fee of 5d., or free where parents were too poor to pay, and free milk. In the case of adult medical services there appears at this time (June 1948) to be little advantage to either side. The insured worker in Britain could secure medical services at a nominal cost.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, his wife was not covered by this system. In Australia all secured the benefit of the hospital subsidy of 6s. a day, and the cost of medical treatment not requiring entry to a hospital was apportioned roughly to the capacity to pay. Clumsy though the Australian system might have been at this date, it was nevertheless true that no sick person was denied treatment because of incapacity to pay. In the matter of maternity assistance the advantage lay with Australia, with its maternity grant of £15 for the first child, £16 for the second and £17 10s. for the third and later children. This may be compared with the existing grant of £2 for wives of insured workers in Britain, though here it must also be remembered that the extensive system of midwives, and the high proportion of women who bore their children in their own homes—in 1946 47 per cent of confinements were in private houses, compared with 40 per cent in the public wards of hospitals—made childbearing in Britain comparatively inexpensive. Further, after July 1948 all women in Britain became entitled to a maternity grant of £4, with an attendance allowance of £1 a week for four weeks.<sup>24</sup>

But more important than the relative advantages provided by one country or the other under existing services are the plans for comprehensive social security being planned in each. Britain has introduced and Australia is planning to introduce a national health and medical service and income security services without a means test. The benefits to be provided under these schemes are roughly comparable. The British adherence to the system of social insurance and the Australian acceptance of the principle of a wage tax at the rate of 1s. 6d. for each £ of income will leave the direct contribution of the low income groups at a slightly lower level in Australia than

<sup>23</sup> Medical services have been "free" in Britain since July 1948, when the new Health Act came into operation.

<sup>24</sup> This applies only to women not employed. Employed women will be entitled to an allowance of 36s. a week for 13 weeks.

in Britain, but will result in a higher individual contribution from those in higher income groups. But on average the differences will be comparatively slight, and with the Commonwealth Government's guarantee of social security benefits to immigrants the new settler will not suffer in this respect.

Examined from the strictly economic angle, it appears safe to conclude that the "working man"—that is, other than the white-collar or professional worker—would not find himself worse off in Australia than in England at recent price levels, so far as basic needs and social services are concerned. But the choice of goods he could purchase with the residual part of his income would be wider in Australia than in Britain—a fact that might cause him to feel he had raised his standard of life, or which on the other hand might encourage him to spend a high proportion of his income on other items than food and house room and thereby to conclude that living costs are higher in Australia than in Britain. In brief, the economic "pull" of Australia is not conspicuously strong, and emigration from Britain, even with full passage provided, must mean a substantial financial sacrifice by the immigrant, for his costs of passage really include the costs of embarkation and re-establishment—for example, furnishing a house—as well as his fare.

An adequate analysis of the dominant motives that lead each intending emigrant to register at Australia House cannot be undertaken here, because the data for such an analysis is not available, but it is probable that a stronger factor in the post-war years than the purely economic has been the social and psychological disturbances arising from the war. The war has encouraged a spirit of adventure, it has encouraged a revolt against the pre-war routine of life, it has left many with a sense of frustration. Post-war Britain may have offered a job, but it has offered no relief from austerity; it has offered higher wages and increased social services, but it has not been able to offer a reduction in working hours beyond the 44-hour week. By contrast many have seen in Australia a land that provides not only a guarantee of a job at similar wages to Britain, but also more open spaces, more sunshine, a shorter working week, more leisure, and a greater incentive to economic initiative. Which one, or which combination, of these factors has influenced the emigrants we cannot say with any certainty, but the significant fact remains that hundreds of thousands of people are still prepared to go to Australia and the other Dominions, and that their movement will mean economic readjustment by Britain unless the effect of their departure can be offset by a vigorous British immigration policy to fill the jobs they vacate.

Thus it is clear that, whatever advantage emigration may bring to the individual, there is a growing conflict of interest at the national level. Nor does the conflict relate only to the national economy. Mass emigration on the scale we have discussed will affect the whole status of Britain as a world power, and thereby the security of Australia. Until 1939 that security was in large measure guaranteed by Britain's capacity to maintain a strong industrial economy, to guarantee the security of colonial territories such as India, Burma, and Malaya, to keep open the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal zone, and to maintain a powerful navy. The rapid withdrawal of Britain from many of these areas and obligations since the war has been due partly to the severity of her manpower crisis. This withdrawal has increased the urgency of expanding Australia's population to a level that will enable her to take over some of the defence responsibilities previously carried by Britain in the Indian Ocean and south-west Pacific areas. But since any future war is likely to be global war, the strengthening of Australia at the expense of Britain might tend to weaken the power of the British Commonwealth as a whole. If we assume that the British Commonwealth will continue to act as a unit in the event of war, the decentralization of defence industries from Britain to some of the more remote areas of the Commonwealth seems desirable, but this is not the same thing as the mass movement through selective emigration of people to the periphery of the Commonwealth. It implies rather the migration of a limited number of industries and their personnel in the interests of the defence of Britain and of the Commonwealth as a whole. We have already suggested that the strength of Britain in Europe is likely to be a powerful factor in the maintenance of political democracy in Western Europe, and the capacity of Britain to play a significant role in this regard will depend in no small measure upon her industrial strength.<sup>25</sup> Nor is there any good reason to assume that the drastic reduction of British population will greatly lessen her vulnerability in the event of war, unless the population is reduced to the point at which it can eke out a subsistence-level living from the products of the soil, for in an atomic war Britain could be paralysed by placing a few atomic bombs in her ports. The obliteration of her population through the bombing of cities would be unnecessary and wasteful, to put the matter crudely.

But again the suggestion of the removal of specific industries and

25 This argument must now be considered in relation to the recent move towards a union of the western European powers. British participation in this union has strengthened the case for the maintenance of an industrially powerful Britain, and the subject of emigration has thus become all the more important.

of the people occupied in them implies more than a voluntary movement of people, for to be carried out on a large scale in a short period it would require the compulsory removal of key personnel. Thus, if we assume that British migration is to remain a voluntary movement, the decentralization of industries essential to the defence of Britain and the Commonwealth can proceed only at the pace at which workers with the necessary skill can either be trained in Australia or at which they will move freely from Britain, and until this decentralization is virtually completed it will be all the more important not to weaken British power, which again is another reason why Australia and the other Dominions might be well advised to seek workers first in non-British areas, or at least to take them from Britain only if they can be replaced in Britain from other sources.

From whatever angle migration is considered there is a clear case for a new approach to the whole subject. So long as each Dominion is bent upon competing separately for immigrants from Britain there is a danger that they may be embarrassing Britain's chance of economic recovery and thereby damaging the strength of the British Commonwealth as a whole. The time is ripe, indeed, for a British Commonwealth Conference on the subject of migration to ascertain where the highest common factor lies between the needs of Britain and of each Dominion.<sup>26</sup> Those concerned with migration policies in British Commonwealth countries have at times admitted that the reservoir of British migrants has practically evaporated, yet they continue to organize large-scale fishing expeditions in the small pool that remains. Also, British leaders have frequently emphasized the fact that Britain has not only no surplus manpower, but a serious dearth. Yet they still admit to Britain's "obligation" to people the empty spaces of the Dominions. Why she should have any such "obligation" is not at all clear, when the subject is examined unemotionally. She has already served the Dominions well by the export of eighteen million people in a century. But to consider that she can go on exporting people at this rate without irreparably damaging her economy is to ignore contemporary demographic and economic realities. And if British leaders themselves will not face these realities the Dominion leaders should do so, if they place any store by Britain's survival.

There appears to be a real danger that official thought and action on the subject of migration will become as unrealistic as it did after the war of 1914-18. Many of those responsible for policy

<sup>26</sup> Here again the urgency for such a conference is increased by recent developments towards a Western European union.

seem to have forgotten the demographic aspects of the matter and to be anticipating again a wholesale redistribution of the white population of the Commonwealth similar to that so confidently advocated between 1917 and the passing of the Empire Settlement Act of 1922. There still appears to be an unwillingness to admit, or an inability to understand, that there has been a demographic, as well as an economic, revolution. The plain fact is that there is a fundamental disharmony today between the needs of Britain and the Dominions. *All* are short of manpower. And while we do not suggest that there should be any restriction on the voluntary movement of people within the Commonwealth, we may reasonably suggest that migration as it is organized at present represents more than a voluntary movement. Immigrants are being induced by free and assisted passages to move from Britain if they have the skill that will be of economic advantage to the Dominions. Might it not be reasonable then to suggest that Britain should offer assisted passages to those in the Dominions who have the skill she requires for her own economic development? The reasonable requirements of Britain as an immigrant country should at least not be ignored. The danger of the present movement is that the competitive bargaining by separate Dominions for British stock might wreck the British plans for economic recovery. A British Commonwealth Migration Conference would encourage a more realistic approach to these problems, and might encourage the Dominions to adapt their migration policies in a manner which would minimize their selective character, either by taking a cross-section of population, or, if this could not be achieved on a voluntary basis, by assuming responsibility for a portion of the British social service budget and national debt.

Let us now summarize our main conclusions regarding British emigration.

1. Britain is short of population in relation to the economy that is being planned.
2. Selective emigration on a large scale could threaten the success of these plans, unless Britain could replace the people thus lost by immigrants from other sources and with similar skill.
3. Australia is short of population in relation to the economy that is being planned.
4. The manpower in short supply in Australia is similar in many respects to that in short supply in Britain.

5. Thus, when considered from the national point of view, there appears to be a conflict of interests between Australia and Britain in regard to migration.

6. But there are still hundreds of thousands of individuals who wish to emigrate from Britain. The precise motives behind the decisions of these people are difficult to analyse, but the dominant ones are probably related to the social and psychological effects of the war. On purely economic grounds the advantages of emigration to Australia appear to be comparatively slight, but there may be advantages of a less tangible character, for example, climatic, opportunities for leisure, and greater scope for initiative.

7. While the voluntary movement of individuals should not be restricted, it should be borne in mind by those planning migration policies that such inducements as free passages may swell the emigrant tide and embarrass Britain's economic position.

8. In view of the consequences of past demographic trends on Britain's age structure in the immediate future, steps should be taken in conjunction with any scheme to minimize the selective tendencies of emigration.

9. Because of the conflict of interests now existing between Britain and the Dominions, and of the dangers to the British economic and international position inherent in the competitive bargaining now proceeding among the Dominions, a British Commonwealth Migration Conference should be called. Through such a conference the manpower requirements of Britain, as well as of each Dominion could be considered, and a scheme of British emigration might be evolved that would keep the balance between the exodus from Britain and her capacity to recruit fresh population from other sources.

## CHAPTER V

### NON-BRITISH IMMIGRATION

BEFORE 1939 migration experts were constantly issuing warnings that the reservoir of exportable manpower in western Europe, like that in Britain, had virtually dried up. Further, there were obvious signs of a "population scare" in some countries as a result of the low level to which fertility had fallen in the twentieth century. Nazi Germany evolved an elaborate pro-natalist policy which was not only to prevent population decline but also to bring about a rapid increase to lend support to the national case for *lebensraum*. Similar measures had already been applied in Fascist Italy. In Sweden, too, a population commission was set up in 1935 to work out a policy that would guarantee at least numerical stability; and in France, where the level of fertility had frequently been below replacement level since the middle of the nineteenth century, further extensions were made in the thirties to their elaborate system of cash allowances to encourage larger families.

The techniques of these policies are not our concern here,<sup>1</sup> but their existence provides evidence of the fear of under-population in many parts of western Europe. Nor need we undertake any elaborate demographic analysis of pre-war Europe. The significant facts are well known and can be conveniently summarized in the following table:

TABLE VI  
VITAL STATISTICS, SELECTED AREAS OF WESTERN EUROPE 1908-12 AND 1935-9

Country	Crude Birth-rates		Crude Death-rates		Crude Rate of Natural Increase		Net Reproduction Rate	
	1908-12	1935-9	1908-12	1935-9	1908-12	1935-9	Rate	Year
England and Wales	25.2	15.0	14.2	12.0	11.0	3.0	0.81	1938
France	19.4	14.9	18.5	15.6	0.9	0.7	0.90	1939
Germany ..	30.0	19.3	16.9	11.9	13.1	7.5	0.98	1940
Netherlands ..	28.7	20.3	19.8	8.7	14.9	11.6	1.16	1941
Sweden ..	26.8	14.5	14.1	11.7	10.6	2.8	0.79	1940
Denmark ..	27.5	17.9	13.4	10.6	14.1	7.2	0.96	1941
Belgium ..	23.6	15.3	15.8	13.0	7.8	2.3	0.67	1941

<sup>1</sup> For a thorough study of pro-natalist policies before the war in European countries see Glass, D. V., *Population: Policies and Movements in Europe* (Oxford, 1940).

It is difficult to secure accurate statistics of the trend of fertility in European countries since 1939, because even where these have been collected during the war, their accuracy must frequently remain open to doubt because of the extensive movement of displaced persons, and because of war casualties. But it is clear that during and since the war there has been a marked rise in the birth-rate of many countries of western Europe.

TABLE VII  
WAR-TIME CRUDE BIRTH-RATES, SELECTED AREAS OF WESTERN EUROPE

Country	Average 1934-8	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
United Kingdom ..	15.3	15.3	15.6	15.7	17.5	18.5	19.9	18.3	20.2	26.0 *
Ireland ..	19.5	19.1	19.1	19.0	22.3	21.9	22.2	22.3	22.5	23.4 *
Belgium ..	15.5	15.3	13.4	12.1	13.1	14.8	15.1	15.5	17.6	18.3 *
France ..	15.1	14.9	14.0	13.3	14.8	15.9	16.4	16.2	20.6	21.2 *
Norway ..	14.8	15.9	16.3	15.5	17.6	19.0	19.5	19.0	22.6 *	—
Sweden ..	14.2	15.4	15.1	15.6	17.7	19.3	20.3	20.2	19.6	—
Denmark ..	17.9	17.8	18.3	18.5	20.4	21.4	22.6	23.5	23.4	—
Netherlands ..	20.3	20.6	20.8	20.3	21.0	23.0	24.0	22.6	30.1	32.2 *

\* Estimated

This increase in recent years provides no clear indication however, that pre-war patterns of fertility have been radically changed. The precise nature or significance of the increase cannot yet be ascertained, but it would appear in many instances to be primarily the result of marriage trends in the post-depression, war, and post-war years. The rapid fall in the birth-rates and reproduction rates of most Western countries between approximately 1930 and 1935 was essentially the result of two factors, the postponement of marriages and the postponement both of early order births to many of those who did marry during the economic depression and of later order births to older women married before the depression. The increase in births in the immediate pre-war and early war years was to some extent the result of births that had been thus "delayed" during the depression, as well as of births to recently married couples. In the post-war years the continued rise in the birth-rate has been largely the result of the "boom" in marriages that followed immediately upon the close of the war. In sum, we may with some assurance conclude that the post-depression and war-time trends in birth-rates and reproduction rates in Western countries reflect the reactions of people who have learnt how to apply birth-control in what may be termed a decade of social abnormality. The tendency for later order births to be reasonably well maintained in recent years provides some grounds for thinking that the decline in fertility may have been checked, but there is no clear evidence that it has

been reversed.<sup>2</sup> The small family will probably remain the norm of Western society.

If the post-war years bring no signs of permanent increase in fertility this will tend to increase the opposition of western European governments to emigration—an opposition that was already apparent before the war. Moreover, it is not the recent levels of fertility that will affect the immediate prospects of emigration from western Europe so much as the levels that prevailed before the war. And if we assume that the pre-war levels of fertility will remain constant in the post-war years, a projection of population change between 1940 and 1970 shows an absolute decline in the case of north-western and central Europe. In southern and eastern Europe a considerable increase is revealed, because these have been areas of high birth-rates. These rates have been sufficiently high to provide a rapid rate of natural increase, despite a much higher level of mortality than in north and west. The most rapid rate of increase is apparent in the U.S.S.R., which, on the basis of our assumptions, will increase from 174 million in 1940 to 251 million in 1970.

TABLE VIII  
POPULATION PROJECTION OF EUROPE (MILLIONS)<sup>3</sup>

European Zone	1940	1970
U.S.S.R. . . . .	174	251
All Europe, excluding U.S.S.R. . . . .	399	417
North-western and Central Europe . . . . .	234	225
Southern and Eastern Europe . . . . .	165	192

More important, so far as emigration is concerned, than the projection of total population is the trend in the age-groups essential to reproduction and to economic activity. Even if we do not allow for war casualties, which of course would further deplete the younger age-groups in the immediate future, there will be, on the basis of our assumptions, a considerable decline in north-western

2 The above paragraph is an attempt to summarize as briefly as possible the results derived from recent developments in the techniques of measuring current fertility trends. These researches emphasize the importance of taking into account trends in nuptiality, the duration of marriage, and the order of birth, as well as the age of the mother at the birth of each child. Consequently the adequacy of the net reproduction rate as a measure of fertility is being attacked. In these important statistical developments Australians have played a significant part. See, for example, Karmel, F. H., "Fertility and Marriages in Australia", *Economic Record*, vol. xx, number 38, 1944, pp. 74-80, and Clark, C., and Dyne, R. E., "Application and Extensions of the Karmel Formula for Reproductivity", *ibid.*, vol. xxii, number 42, 1946, pp. 23-39. For an example of work in England see Hajnal, J., "Aspects of Recent Trends in Marriage in England and Wales", *Population Studies*, number 1 (June), 1947, pp. 72-98, and "The Analysis of Birth Statistics in the Light of the Recent International Recovery of the Birth Rate", *ibid.*, number 2, (September), 1947, pp. 137-64. A useful summary of recent developments in demographic statistics is contained in Vincent, P., "Comment déterminer la tendance de la fécondité?", *Population*, number 3 (July-September), 1947.

3 Based upon the projections given in Notestein, F. W., *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union: Population Projections* (Geneva, 1944). War casualties are not taken into account in this projection.

and central Europe amongst those under the age of 35. On the other hand there will be a substantial increase in the older groups, especially in those over the age of 65 (see Table VIII).

Thus it is apparent that it is only in southern and eastern Europe that fertility has been high enough to ensure in the near future an increase in the younger adult population. For some time yet the age structure of these groups in northern, western, and central Europe will carry the scars of the heavy casualties suffered in the war of 1914-18 and of the decline in the fertility of those young adults whose ranks were depleted by that war. Both the first World War and the economic depression of the thirties with its effect upon the level of fertility have left western Europe with "hollow classes" that will not grow out of the age structure of its population until almost the end of the century. It is largely the children of that young adult generation decimated by the war of 1914-18 who have suffered the heaviest casualties of the war of 1939-45, and if these casualties were subtracted from the above projections the ageing tendency would be even more apparent. These, briefly, are the factors that have left western Europe with a dearth of productive manpower at the moment when, as a result of the reconstruction needs of Europe, the demand for labour is at a maximum.

As in the case of Britain, the relation between these trends and emigration can only be discussed on the basis of certain assumptions, which may or may not prove to be realistic in the light of future events. If the economies of western European countries fail to recover from the devastation of the war—if coal from the Ruhr is not mined, if raw materials from eastern Europe are not forthcoming, and if the lack of capital prevents the purchase of the machinery essential to start the wheels of industry turning again—then Europe will be grossly overpopulated in relation to the available resources. The ability of western Europe to carry a population of increasing density during the past century has been due essentially to its capacity to sell manufactured goods in return for raw materials and foodstuffs, and only by the maintenance of an adequate system of international trade can it continue to do so. As for eastern Europe, its capacity to carry a rapidly increasing population in the future must depend upon the same factors. But it cannot be assumed that the collapse of European economy will set in motion a great exodus of people to oversea territories, unless that collapse is accompanied by relative prosperity in potential areas of immigration. It should be remembered that the periods of extensive emigration overseas from Europe during this century have coincided with periods of relative

TABLE IX

POPULATION PROJECTIONS BY AGE-GROUPS (THOUSANDS)<sup>4</sup>.

Age-group	North-western and Central Europe					West-Central Europe					Southern and Eastern Europe					
	1940	1950	1960	1970	1940	1950	1960	1970	1940	1950	1960	1970	1940	1950	1960	1970
20-34	54,900	52,700	52,000	47,100	37,600	36,300	37,000	35,500	40,200	43,700	48,300	44,200				
35-44	35,200	37,600	33,400	34,000	25,000	26,400	22,500	24,100	21,000	26,000	25,700	31,100				
45-64	49,900	57,300	65,100	63,800	34,600	40,300	45,900	43,900	26,600	32,400	40,900	45,300				
15-64	159,000	165,000	166,000	158,000	111,000	115,000	117,000	111,000	103,000	119,000	130,000	135,000				
65 +	20,000	23,900	27,200	32,800	13,800	16,400	18,700	22,900	9,670	11,200	13,400	17,300				

<sup>4</sup>Notestein, F. W., *The Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union*, pp. 242, 254, 286. "West-Central Europe" combines Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, and Switzerland. North-western and Central Europe includes "West-central Europe", and the United Kingdom and Ireland, and "Northern Europe" (i.e. Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Norway, Sweden).

prosperity in Europe, and not of economic recession. For example, Europe lost some 8 million people through emigration in the decade 1900-10, but during the thirties European emigration was almost entirely offset by the return of earlier emigrants.<sup>5</sup> In the latter period the application of restrictive legislation, especially in America, was a factor limiting emigration from Europe, but this in itself was evidence of the inability of immigrant countries to isolate themselves from world economic trends. In the future the situation will be different only if they can so isolate themselves. Is this possible?

Consider first the position of western Europe. The recovery of this zone will continue to depend for some time upon the level of economic activity in, and the degree of assistance proffered by the United States of America. If Marshall Aid can set western Europe on its feet again it will reduce the need and probably the desire for emigration. Further, effective use of Marshall Aid will require an adequate labour force.

This fear of "under-population" is most clearly seen in France, where there has been a lively concern since the war regarding the inability of fertility to supply an adequate labour force or to guarantee the nation's security. Elaborate measures are being taken to increase the size of the family.<sup>6</sup> These, and the extended social services now in operation, can only be maintained if there is an adequate labour force, and this French demographers and economists consider France does not possess. As a result of the small number of births to the "hollow classes" so severely reduced during the war of 1914-18, there is an acute shortage of manpower in France between the ages of 25 and 29. Thus in 1946 those aged 25 to 29 numbered only 2,107,000 compared with 3,000,000 aged 35 to 39.<sup>7</sup> Further it is estimated that the French population declined by 1,450,000 during the second World War.<sup>8</sup> Thus an

5 Milbank Memorial Fund, *Postwar Problems of Migration* (New York, 1947), pp. 55-6.

6 Family allowances have been increased much beyond the pre-war level. As a result of a law of 22 August 1946, the income of a family of three children is increased by an amount equal to 50 per cent of the average monthly wage of an unskilled metal-worker in Paris. In addition, a family of three children in which the income is derived from a single source (*salaire unique*), is entitled to a further 40 per cent of this monthly wage. A maternity grant equal to three times the monthly wage is also paid for first births where the mother is under the age of 25, or where she has been married for less than two years, and for each subsequent birth occurring within three years of the previous maternity.

7 Ledermann, S., "Composition par âge de la population française", *Population*, number 2, (April-June), 1946, pp. 351-5.

8 This loss was made up of:

Direct losses	..	600,000
Indirect losses due to war (e.g. due to malnutrition, infant mortality etc.)	..	300,000
Excess of "normal" deaths over births	..	230,000
Emigration	..	320,000

1,450,000

See Vincent, P., "Conséquences de six années de Guerre sur la population française", *Population*, number 3, (July-September), 1946, p. 434.

influx of immigrants is sought to recover losses suffered by war, to increase the level of production, and to maintain economic efficiency at a level that will enable the country to carry its social services—and especially those designed to increase the future labour cohort of France. A significant step in the development of France's post-war immigration policy was taken in March 1947, when an agreement was signed with Italy for the introduction of 200,000 Italian workers for French industry and agriculture. Under the agreement family allowances to which the immigrants were entitled were to be remitted to their families in Italy. Further, each migrant entering the mines was entitled to a grant of 2000 francs, while those entering other employment were to receive half this amount.<sup>9</sup> In addition France has already absorbed over 100,000 prisoners of war and is seeking other migrants from Germany and Italy. In short, as the French economic system recovers, she is resuming her role of the chief magnet for the migrant population of Europe. In the decade 1920-30 the net gain of migration into France was approximately two million, and these people came from almost every country in Europe, particularly Poland and Italy.<sup>10</sup> Thus every step towards complete recovery will increase the competition that France offers to oversea countries in the migrant market.

If, on the other hand, the economy of western Europe fails to recover, what will be the prospects of emigration? First, such a collapse will almost certainly not be a local phenomenon. It will probably spring from an economic recession in America; and for that reason will vitally affect Britain as well as western Europe and also the Dominions. Now the capacity of Australia to absorb immigrants still depends to a considerable extent upon the level of her exports, especially of primary products. If there is a collapse in the world prices of these the capacity of Australia to secure the machine tools and other equipment necessary to her industrial development may be greatly reduced, and it is only in secondary industries that Australia can absorb migrants in any large numbers.

Now let us turn to eastern Europe. In the inter-war years immigrant countries began to tighten the restrictions against the entry of Italians and the Balkan peoples. There was of course a very good economic reason for this. These people did not generally have the skill required for the development of industrial economies. The manpower that became "surplus" to the needs of these eastern countries was primarily that with a low degree of skill, highly

<sup>9</sup> The full text of the agreement is published in *Population*, number 2, (April-June), 1947, pp. 398-400.  
<sup>10</sup> Milbank Memorial Fund, *Postwar Problems of Migration*, p. 61.

skilled labour being readily absorbed by the development of home industries.<sup>11</sup> In the post-war years this tendency for unskilled manpower to be surplus to home needs is likely to prevail in the east. However, the desire for increasing industrialization, and the widespread tendency for this to be organized within the framework of controlled economies, is encouraging the restriction of emigration by the governments of these countries. Briefly, many eastern European countries are adopting the same attitude to migration as did Germany and Italy before 1939—emigration is to be discouraged because it is unpatriotic, because it will weaken the status of the nation-state, and because it is considered that all hands, even unskilled, are wanted for the programmes of industrialization. Nor is there any good reason to believe that the drive of these countries towards industrialization will not meet with a considerable measure of success. They are in a much better bargaining position than they were before the war. If their separation from western Europe continues they will turn increasingly to Russia, and so far there is no indication that Russia intends to use these countries as its larder, as Germany did. The Eastern Zone of Germany can now fulfil that role, and the strength of the eastern European countries as allies of the Soviet will be in their industrial potential. Again, if trade with the west is revived the east will be able to resume its purchases of capital machinery for industrialization. And finally, if the economy of western Europe collapses, eastern Europe may be seriously inconvenienced, but if the component countries can retain the degree of international co-operation amongst themselves and the ideological affinity with Russia that they have shown since the war ended they will probably avoid economic collapse.

Thus, whether considered from the ideological or economic aspects, eastern Europe is likely to become increasingly opposed to emigration. And even if this conclusion proves unsound, there is no indication of any fundamental change in the attitude of immigrant countries towards eastern Europeans as settlers. The most likely "sponge" outside Europe for absorbing surplus eastern Europeans appears at first sight to be the Latin American countries, whose post-war policies are designed to secure farmers and farm labourers rather than industrial labourers. But at the same time as these countries are appealing for mass immigration they are adopting highly selective techniques.<sup>12</sup> In Columbia, for example, Bulgarians,

<sup>11</sup> The demand for unskilled labour may, however, prove greater in the future in western European and overseas countries than it was before the war, because of a tendency to recruit skilled labour from the metropolitan population, rather than through immigration. This point is discussed below, especially in Chapter VII.

<sup>12</sup> Milbank Memorial Fund, *Postwar Problems of Migration*, pp. 30-48.

Greeks, Po'es Romanians, and many other eastern European peoples are admitted only if they comply with a series of requirements that are difficult to fulfil. In Brazil no foreigner who has contracted to work in a particular occupation can change this occupation without permission of the relevant authority. The lack of economic opportunity which Latin America offers the immigrant is likely to turn any migrant pressure from eastern Europe to other sources. But where? Almost every other immigrant country outside Europe wants industrial manpower, not agricultural labourers, and they prefer northern Europeans to those from southern and eastern zones. And in this regard Australia is no exception.

Thus when we analyse the situation from the economic point of view, the prospects for large-scale emigration from Europe do not appear to be considerable. Further, most non-European immigrant countries are likely to be competing not only against each other, but also against the new immigrant countries of Europe itself, such as France and Britain, for a world shortage of migrants with industrial skill. The main sources of emigrants in the post-war period would appear to be amongst the displaced persons of Europe and from Germany and Italy. Australia had already agreed (June 1948) to take 12,000 a year of these, and has since raised the figure to 20,000. But this is a rapidly drying reservoir if European recovery continues. Latin American Governments have contracted to take 83,000 and Canada 25,000.<sup>13</sup> Further, these people are being sought in Europe by France, Britain, Sweden, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland. In 1943 the number of people moved from their homes as the result of military campaigns, refugee evacuations, and labour recruitment by the Axis powers, was estimated at the enormous total of 30 million.<sup>14</sup> Later war-time developments probably increased this figure. But since the war many of these people have been either returned to their countries of origin or absorbed into European countries, and at the close of 1946 the estimated "hard-core" of displaced persons available for oversea emigration was placed at 850,000,<sup>15</sup> and in February 1948 this had been further reduced to 300,000.<sup>16</sup> As for Germans, the migrant pool here may be much reduced if the ideological rivalry between Soviet Russia and the West encourages the revival of industry in western Germany in order to strengthen the front line of defence against Communism.

In Italy where 1,700,000 people have yet to be employed in

<sup>13</sup> Preparatory Commission of the I.R.O., *Monthly Digest*, number 2, October 1947.

<sup>14</sup> E. M. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe* (I.L.O., Montreal, 1943), p. 163.

<sup>15</sup> Milbank Memorial Fund, *Postwar Problems of Migration*, p. 64.

<sup>16</sup> *The Times*, 10 February 1948, Report of the European Manpower Conference.

productive work, the local absorption of surplus manpower is likely to be slower, but the greater part of this unemployment is in the rural south, and the majority of these people have not the skill Australia is seeking. Moreover, as we have already emphasized, the Australian immigration programme is not at present designed to seek immigrants in large numbers from these people. Nor does there appear to be any indication that the present Government is prepared to give added attention to the migration of Italians or other southern Europeans of this type should northern Europe, Britain, and America fail to produce the full quota of 70,000 new settlers each year.

Our analysis so far has been based primarily upon the prospects of emigration from the economic point of view. But is this sufficient? The economic factor has provided the main incentive for emigration during the past hundred years, but other factors cannot now be ignored. The urge of many thousands of people to leave Europe, which so impressed the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Committee during its tour of the Continent in 1945, was undoubtedly not motivated only by economic considerations. To many Europeans the New World appeared to offer freedom from the political bickerings of Europe and from the continual threat of having their countries and their homes turned into battlefields. Many probably still thought they could pioneer a new existence for themselves and their families that would bring them nearer to their ideal of an adequate life. We cannot separate the motives that induce the modern European migrant to move any more than we were able to isolate those influencing the decision of the thousands of British people. Whatever the precise reasons, the urge to emigrate was still strongly apparent in 1946 in many of those countries whose governments were pleading acute shortages of manpower. A survey in the Netherlands in April 1946 revealed that 22 per cent would emigrate if they had the choice. In France, a survey of January 1946 produced these results: 27 per cent preferred to live in another country than France, and of these 9 per cent desired to stay in Europe, while 12 per cent wished to settle in America and 6 per cent in French colonies. A similar survey in August indicated that the proportion desiring to leave France had fallen to 16 per cent.<sup>17</sup>

17 Milbank Memorial Fund, *Postwar Problems of Migration*, p. 65. The results of these polls would vary greatly with the vagaries of the international situation. Some who said they "would like" to emigrate had probably never contemplated the problem of uprooting home and financing migration. Others may have been interviewed when they had just read a further sombre report on the development of atomic weapons. Two days later they may have been less pessimistic about their prospects in Europe. At the time of writing, for example, I have been informed that a survey just taken in Britain has revealed that over 40 per cent of the population wish to emigrate. This survey coincided with the breakdown of the Allied Control Council in Berlin. A survey a month later might have considerably lowered this figure.

But however strong the non-economic factors influencing these opinions may have been, the ultimate test of successful migration must remain economic security and assimilability and if these people are forced to remain in Europe until they again secure an economic footing, many will hesitate to abandon that security. Further, it is not improbable that many of the countries of western, as well as of eastern Europe, will attempt to prevent the emigration of workers considered essential to national welfare once shipping is available. At the moment there is little need for those countries to be concerned, for apart from those being moved by the International Refugees Organization, few ships other than British are available to carry emigrants "in bulk" to the Americas and the Dominions; and as far as migration to Australia is concerned, the British shipping space available is likely to be completely filled during the next eighteen months by British emigrants under the Australian policy of "British first".

Thus it is clear that in the case of European migration, as of British, Australia is faced with a number of problems. She is competing with other countries for the scarcity of skilled labour. She has again to overcome her geographical remoteness from Europe with its consequent effect upon the costs to the migrant; she has to face the problem of securing transport for the emigrants before they become absorbed into gainful occupations in Europe; and she cannot ignore the effect of a mass exodus from Europe upon her own as well as upon European economy. So while the prospects of securing several thousand, and perhaps several hundred thousand, emigrants are brighter at the moment than at any time since the turn of the century, the long-term prospects of large-scale emigration from Europe do not appear particularly bright, unless we assume the collapse of the whole European economic structure.

Finally the question must be asked: Is the movement of people the solution to the maldistribution existing in many parts of the world between people and available resources? If we forget for the moment Australia's need for a larger population and attempt to view the matter objectively, there can be little doubt that the attempt to solve this problem through emigration alone, or even primarily, is not the most satisfactory procedure. Emigration is the essential machinery for preventing the pressure of numbers against resources only when facilities are not available to carry resources to people. Emigration was the machinery that could most effectively be put into operation in the nineteenth century, but with the modern command of technical resources, and the facilities for fast transport of raw materials there is much to be said for tempering

emigration with a policy to increase the available resources where population density is already high. The low living standards of eastern Europe have been due essentially to two factors—the lack of certain raw materials essential to their industrialization, and the lack of the capital equipment essential to the full development of the resources they possess. Conversely, the high living standards of many western European countries, and especially of densely populated areas such as Belgium and Britain, have been due primarily to the opportunities they have had to acquire raw materials from without the metropolitan territories. In other words, mobility of resources is as important as mobility of manpower in ironing out differential living standards, and it can be shown that Australia should not ignore the significance of this fact while she is so vigorously seeking to double her own population,<sup>18</sup> for if the Western peoples can show that population pressure can be thus eased, they will help to reduce the strength of the argument of some Asiatics that emigration is the only cure for "over-population"—and it is just this fear of Asiatic pressures that is one of the major forces behind the present planning of the Commonwealth Government.

Nevertheless, while Australia should not ignore the importance of this argument regarding the mobility of resources, as opposed to manpower, she should have her immigration plans ready to take the assimilable settlers who may still be available because of maldistribution in Europe's labour forces. The increase in the mobility of resources as a solution to this problem is still a consummation devoutly to be wished. The maintenance of an intense nationalism in many European countries, the dollar famine, and the ideological split between east and west, with its consequent effect upon trade policies, are tending to reduce the mobility of resources and thereby to increase rather than to reduce the need for migration. Australia should not hesitate to take advantage of this reality, but neither should it be forgotten that the long-term interests of this country can best be served by increasing the mobility of resources.

In this chapter we have not endeavoured to do more than consider briefly the prospects of European emigration to Australia on the basis of given assumptions. To attempt more than this is clearly unwise. The future of western Europe still hangs in the balance, and we who live in this generation are too close to the momentous events of this century to enable us to appreciate clearly the significance of what is happening. It may be that we are witnessing the death of the civilization of a continent, in which case there may be

<sup>18</sup> See Chapter VI.

another vast migration from Europe with no clear relation to the demographic or economic factors we have discussed. On the other hand there is some evidence that western Europe is beginning to breathe again after the devastation of six years of war, and if this recovery continues some of the arguments we have stated here will have point. But we cannot easily anticipate what the effect of ideological rivalries in Europe will be upon any migratory movement that may result from economic factors. We have only discussed probabilities on the assumption that the movement of people will be possible, but we have hinted that there are already signs that new governments in Europe will not permit such movement if they consider that the national interest may thereby be served. Hence we may be entering an era when migration has to be considered in terms of ideologies and politics, and no longer in terms of economics or individual ambition. Australia may wish to attract European migrants in the national interest—and, to induce them to move, may offer to pay their passage; equally, European countries may wish to hold their people in the national interest and refuse passports for intending migrants. This possibility should be recognized by those planning Australia's policy, because so long as the right to move voluntarily is not considered to be an essential human liberty, no migration plan that may threaten national welfare can expect to succeed.

## CHAPTER VI

### EASTERN PRESSURES

So far our discussion of immigration to Australia has been concerned only with the introduction of "white" settlers. We emphasized the fact that there appears to be no possibility that the present Government, or any other that may replace it in the near future, is likely to adopt a different policy. Although the term "White Australia" does not find a place in any immigration Act, it remains nevertheless a concept that few Australians are not prepared to defend. Even those who might argue that there is a case for admitting a quota of coloured immigrants would be careful to frame any policy they might advocate in such a way as to preserve the "whiteness" of the Commonwealth. In short, there is still and there will remain a'most unanimous support for Mr Beasley's statement in 1945 that once there is any compromise with the White Australia Policy the whole policy is lost.

The non-Australian cannot appreciate the strength of Australian feeling on this subject unless he knows something of its history.<sup>1</sup> The policy of excluding Asiatics from Australia is almost a century old. It was first applied in 1855 when the Colony of Victoria imposed an entry tax on Chinese, who were then present on the gold fields to the number of 17,000. Further efforts to tighten restrictions met with opposition from the British Government which stated that any legislation "intended to exclude from any part of Her Majesty's Dominions the subjects of a state at peace with Her Majesty is highly objectionable". As a result of this opposition a more lenient attitude was temporarily adopted.

From 1867 to 1877 Asiatics were free to enter Australia, but the rapid influx of Chinese to Queensland in this period again raised the issue of protecting "white" settlers against the inroads of cheap labour. A Restriction Act passed in 1877 controlled the situation in Queensland, but in the eighties opinions in all colonies hardened against the Chinese—and particularly the opinions of the developing labour unions, which feared that the Chinese would threaten the

<sup>1</sup> An excellent short summary of the development of the White Australia Policy and of its significance today is given in two articles by Professor A. P. Elkin in *A White Australia: Australia's Population Problem* (Sydney, 1947), pp. 174 *et seq.*

wage levels of "white" workers. Measures proposed by the Premiers' Conferences in 1888 and 1896 were again held up in Britain on the point that the Empire did not discriminate on the ground of race or colour. The result was that attempts were then made to find a formula which would not imply race prejudice, but which would justify the exclusion of all Asiatics on economic grounds. On the suggestion of the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, the principle of an education test, which was in use in Natal, was adopted. An Act embodying this principle for the whole of Australia was passed by Barton's Commonwealth Government immediately after Federation in 1901, immigration being one of the powers granted to the Commonwealth under the new constitution.

Under this Act a test in a prescribed European language could be imposed as the condition of entry of any immigrant, with the intention that only those immigrants who were considered undesirable should be submitted to the test. The purpose was to secure a "white" Australia. The avowed object was to protect economic standards, and not to exclude on racial grounds. When Japan protested that the reference to a "European language" placed Asiatics on an inferior footing, the Act was amended in 1905 to provide for a test in "any prescribed language". The Act as amended in 1905 has remained the basis of Australia's legislation to control immigration. Since its operation the Asiatic population of Australia has steadily decreased. There were 47,000 Asiatics in Australia in 1901, compared with 21,400 in 1933. By the latter date ninety-seven per cent of the Australian population was of British stock.

Such, briefly, is the background of Australia's immigration restriction policy. The main justification of the view that the policy is intended to exclude on economic or social grounds rather than racial is perhaps the fact that the dictation test has on occasions been applied to white immigrants as well as to non-white—the last occasion being in March 1947, when a German refugee who was identified as having been in charge of a Nazi concentration camp during the war, was effectively barred from entry to the country. But the reality of the policy is that non-white immigrants have not been permitted to enter the country, while white immigrants have been freely granted permits to land. The intention of our policy is nowhere better stated than in the Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia:

In pursuance of the "White Australia" policy, the general practice is not to permit Asiatics or other coloured immigrants to enter Australia for purposes of settling permanently. (*Bona fide* merchants, students or tourists may enter and remain whilst they retain their status)<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> *Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1938, p. 373.*

Now this policy of exclusion, whether on economic or racial grounds, has been comparatively easy to maintain up to the present, for three reasons. First, the peoples of Asia have been effectively "controlled" by Western powers. Almost half of them have lived in colonial territories of Britain, France, and Holland; such as India, Burma, Indo-China, and the Netherlands Indies. Dependent peoples cannot easily kick against the pricks of an immigration policy of an independent country, which in effect Australia has been since she became a Federal Commonwealth. Further, the defence of "White Australia" remained easy so long as these Western nations had the effective power to impose their will upon the colonial territories, and upon independent countries of Asia.

Second, the rate of population growth in most Eastern countries, independent as well as colonial, was controlled pretty effectively by the extremely low standards of living. Famine and disease carried off the surplus whenever numbers tended to grow faster than the supply of food. The two important exceptions were Japan and the Netherlands Indies, of which we will say more later.

Third, the low living standards and high degree of illiteracy were effective barriers to the free movement of large numbers of Asiatics, who knew little of other countries, who were not conscious of a problem of "over-population", and who had not the wherewithal to emigrate in any case. The first Chinese introduced into New South Wales by Wentworth and the pastoralists were not free migrants; they were sought by white agents in search of coolie labour.

But all this is being changed, and changed rapidly, as a survey of population and political trends in Asiatic countries indicates. Let us look first at population trends in four major areas, Japan, India, China, and Indo-China. Here we lack the detailed statistical material, except in the case of Japan, available in Western countries, but we have enough evidence to indicate broad trends and to grasp their significance for Australia.<sup>3</sup>

In the case of Japan we have a population that has increased from 32 million in 1850 to 73 million in 1940. But the reason for this increase has been primarily the lowering of mortality, the same as in the West, and not an increasing birth-rate. In other words the non-Christian Japanese population reacted to the adoption of Western industrial techniques as did the Christian people of the West. Improvements in food supply, in sanitation, and in health brought the death-rate down from 31 per 1000 of population in 1898-1902 to 23 in 1935-9. By the latter period mortality was still much

<sup>3</sup> For a useful study of population trends in Asia see the Milbank Memorial Fund, *Demographic Studies of Selected Areas of Rapid Growth* (New York, 1944).

higher than in, say, Britain or Australia, but the improvement was considerable. And, as there was little evidence of controlled fertility before 1935, the rate of population growth increased.

In short, we may say that in pre-war Japan the first stage of the cycle of growth, falling mortality, had ended by 1935. The second phase, controlled fertility, was beginning to appear in the Japanese cities by 1935, but it had not assumed important dimensions, and had the war not intervened the rate of growth of the Japanese population would probably have continued to increase for several decades until the birth-control habit became widespread.

Casualties suffered in the recent war will have caused a slight check to population growth in Japan, but it is probable that the Japanese population will attain the figure of 100,000,000 by the year 2000, compared with 73,000,000 in 1940. But neither this rate of growth, nor the sixty per cent increase in Japanese population between 1870 and 1920, is any higher than that which prevailed in Britain or other Western countries during their most rapid periods of growth. There is indeed little exceptional about the evolution of Japanese population after 1870. Japan has merely advanced further in its demographic evolution, as it has advanced further in its industrial organization, than the rest of Asia.

Australians sometimes take fright when confronted with the figures of India's population increase. In the ten years before 1941 the increase was 51 million, or more than the whole population of Britain. But when we remember that there are 400 million Indians today, the rate of increase is less staggering than the figures suggest. Since 1920 the annual average rate of increase in India has been about one per cent, and has been attained despite very high mortality rates. Only 54 per cent of the babies born alive in India remain alive at the age of 15, and half of the people of India die before the age of 30.

Broadly speaking, India is still living in a condition of uncontrolled fertility with a food supply that is insufficient to keep alive much more than half of the babies born. Mortality, not birth-control, is the great check to India's population growth. But it is probable that the British rule in India has had its effect in stimulating population growth. The recent famines in Bengal and elsewhere have been less widespread and less destructive of life than those that occurred in the nineteenth century, and the reason for the increasing rate of growth since 1920 has almost certainly been the immense development of irrigation, which now waters about twenty per cent of the cultivated area of India, and the improvements in transport and communication that have facilitated the distribution of food.

These measures have reduced mortality. But India today is still in a parlous plight. The food supplies are inadequate to permit any great increase in numbers. To carry the population that has been swollen, as it were, by contacts with Western techniques, the improvements so far made in agriculture, health, transport, and other fields must be maintained and expanded. And this provides the key to the real population problem of India. Every improvement in these techniques will tend to lower mortality, and every reduction in mortality will require more food and health services to keep alive the additional people. The one cannot go on without the other, and the faster the one develops the faster the other must tend to develop too.

Now consider this in relation to the present plans of India's leaders. They are determined to raise living standards, and if they can begin their programme they will have to expand and develop it at an increasingly rapid pace, unless the population increase that will follow each improvement is not to defeat the whole scheme. The possibility of the early application of birth-control methods to limit the rate of population growth can be taken as negligible. The state of illiteracy and the strength of religious customs opposed to birth-control are alone sufficient guarantees against this possibility. Thus the solution to India's problem of "over-population" can only be found in an agricultural and industrial revolution designed to increase immeasurably the productivity of the soil and to bring into production the known resources of India. India is "over-populated" today fundamentally because only about nine per cent of those resources are being utilized. America is utilizing some forty-five per cent of its known resources. India has one of the lowest standards of living in the world today, and America one of the highest.

What we have said of India is broadly true of China. Here population figures are very inadequate, but in some small areas detailed studies of vital indices have been made, and they indicate that the force of life is almost equalled by the force of death. Famine and disease are still strong enough to check the rate of growth, and there is no clear sign here of any recent trend, as there has been in India since 1920, towards an acceleration of the rate of growth of population. But here, as in India, "over-population" can only be cured by bringing into production the agricultural and industrial resources of the country, and as soon as measures are instituted to tackle this problem they must be carried on with increasing speed and efficiency if they are not to be defeated by the sheer pressure of numbers that will arise from every reduction in

mortality. What the precise population of China is today no one knows, for there has been no satisfactory census in modern times, but it is probably in the region of 400 million, and may have been so for a century. But whatever it is, there is enough human material here to provide more people in a century than there are in the whole of Europe today if the gap between fertility and mortality can be widened just a little by a steady improvement in agricultural and industrial efficiency.

When we move south of China to Indonesia we find that there appears to have been a rapid population increase during the past fifty years, the average annual rate of growth being perhaps as high as two per cent. This has been made possible by improvements in agricultural techniques and health services, and by the emigration of some of the people from the densely populated islands of Java and Madura to the outlying territories of the Dutch possessions. The Netherlands Indies had already begun to feel the consequences of reduced mortality before 1940, and as in the case of India the "swollen" population that has resulted from this can only now be maintained by a continued and rapid expansion in the development of the islands' resources. There are already 72 million people in these areas, and if recent trends are continued there will be 130 million by the end of the century—a figure only 10 million short of the present population of the United States of America.

To see the overwhelming numerical preponderance of Asiatic countries over the "white" countries of the Pacific we need only glance at the population figures for 1940, and at the "projected" population, calculated on the assumption that recent pre-war rates of increase will be maintained during the next two or three decades.

TABLE X  
POPULATION PROJECTIONS, INDIA, AND THE PACIFIC AREA.

Area		Population, 1940 (millions)	Estimated Population, 1970 (millions)
Japan ..	..	73	88
India ..	..	380	550
Chinese Empire ..	..	400	500
Indonesia ..	..	72	110
Australia ..	..	7	8
New Zealand ..	..	2	3

In quantity, therefore, the white peoples of the Pacific are clearly not capable of competing with the coloured, but this cannot be reasonably used as an argument in itself for altering or giving up the traditional White Australia policy. Rather it provides a clue to

the type of problem this country must face in the future. What we are witnessing today is in effect a revolutionary redistribution of the numerical balance of the world's population, not through migration, but through differential rates of natural increase. In the West the determinant of population change has become the rational control of births. In the East it is the quantity of foodstuffs. But what is the relevance of this demographic revolution to Australia's immigration policy?

A controlled fertility has created a desperate shortage of manpower in Australia in relation to immediate future economic requirements. The strategic necessity for a greater population is also more urgent than ever, partly as a result of the insufficiency of manpower in Britain to maintain the international commitments carried earlier in the century. It is at this point that we must in practice face the problems discussed in the previous chapters. But if we ignore these difficulties for the moment and assume, for the purpose of argument, that immigrants can be secured in any required quantity, what population can Australia expect to acquire by the end of the century?

That it will be far short of 20 million is obvious. The attainment of this figure by 2000 A.D. would require, on the basis of present fertility trends, the immediate introduction of almost 200,000 immigrants annually, rising to more than 500,000 by the end of the century. This is quite clearly beyond the estimated annual absorptive capacity of 2 per cent. If the present immigration target of 70,000 immigrants a year is maintained steadily till the end of the century, and if these immigrants raise families of a size equal to the average prevailing in Australia today, they will add in all about 3.5 million to the population by 2000 A.D. Our earlier projection of the Australian population in that year, migration excluded, was 8 million. Thus at this level of migration, assuming recent levels of fertility prevail in the future, Australia would close the century with 11.5 million people.

Quantitatively the addition of another three and a half million people will do nothing to counteract the overwhelming preponderance of Asiatics in the Pacific area, but qualitatively it may do much to give Australia security in the measurable future, and to justify the adherence to the principles of a White Australia policy.

For Australia's future security industrial strength is likely to be more important than a large population, particularly in an atomic age. But the population needs to be large enough to enable the weapons of war to be mass-produced in time of emergency. Further, Australia must now be prepared to assume some of the defence responsibilities previously carried by Britain. The loss of power by

Britain in Asia may have been offset to some extent by the growth of American strength in the Pacific, but even so Australia cannot afford to run the risk again of undue dependence upon an outside power for her own defence. Another three million people with industrial and technical skill would perhaps double Australia's defence power because of the resulting possibilities of large-scale industrial production.

But while a moderate increase in Australia's population would provide a more than proportionate increase in the country's industrial production and defence power, it is not at all certain that the industrialization of Asiatic countries will increase their power by the end of this century. To generalize from the case of Japan is unsound. The rapid development of the industrial strength of Japan was due to a number of factors that are not likely to be repeated in the rest of Asia. Japan had political unity, a concentrated population that could move easily to the industrial towns, the ready assistance of foreign capital and foreign technical advice, and signs of the beginnings of fertility control before population growth threatened to destroy the material advances made during half a century. Japan's development was indeed in no small measure due to her ability to capitalize upon the imperial rivalries of the Western nations.

Industrialization in other Asiatic countries is likely to be a more difficult affair than it was in the case of Japan. In most instances they lack political unity, they need technical advisers whom European countries can ill afford to export, and their population is dispersed and in many cases largely illiterate. In the cases of India and China, their vast numbers add greatly to the problem of industrial organization, even if political unity can be achieved. Further, while the Eastern nations may industrialize to the point of using coal as motive power and "natural" resources for industrial production, by the time they do so industrial strength may be so much determined by other sources of power and artificially produced raw materials that they will still remain weak in relation to the West. And finally, until Asia can encourage the rational control of births, every industrial improvement that increases the supply of foodstuffs will tend to be offset by an increase in the rate of population growth. In this regard Asia is in quite a different position from Europe at the dawn of its industrialization. Europe was for the most part relatively sparsely populated; Asia for the most part is already densely populated. Thus the quantity of the populations with which Asiatic countries have to cope is likely to be for some time a source of weakness rather than of strength. With half their

present numbers their escape from poverty through the development of industrial economies could perhaps be accomplished with relative ease.

Thus a White Australia policy that achieves only the limited aim we have set will probably increase Australia's strength as an *Eastern* power. But the problem does not end there. While there may be no good reason to fear the numerical preponderance of Asia, an immigration policy cannot ignore ethical and moral factors, nor can it afford to ignore the fact that any policy that injures the susceptibility of Asiatic progress may draw to their support strong Western powers and so increase international friction.

Australians defend their White Australia policy on the grounds that the right to exclude is based upon economic, and not upon racial arguments. The assumption appears to be that it is ethically right for the State to take action only to defend material living standards, and that colour or race provides no ground for exclusion. But while this may appear to the West a reasonable basis on which to base an immigration policy, it is clear that many Asiatic leaders do not interpret it in this manner. In the dispute in the last session of the United Nations Assembly in 1946 between the Union of South Africa and India concerning the status of Indians resident in the former country, the representatives of the coloured peoples showed surprising solidarity, and evidence of some uneasiness by the Australian delegation regarding the implications of the outcome of this dispute was apparent in their action in abstaining from voting. That direct pressure has not been brought to bear since then upon Australia and other countries following an Asiatic exclusion policy has been due to the problems of inter-racial migration with which the Asiatic countries themselves have been faced during the past few years. For example, at the Inter-Asian Conference held in New Delhi in March-April 1947 the main concern was not with the policies of "white" countries, but with the problem of social minorities within Asiatic countries themselves, for example, the Chinese in Malaya and the Indians in Burma.<sup>4</sup> Until the Asiatic countries who now enjoy national independence can solve this problem, it is difficult for them to claim the right of their nationals to migrate to white countries.

But if the Asiatic peoples, as a result of their own failure to deal with their problem of racial minorities, are not yet in a position to demand on racial grounds the right of their nationals to migrate to white countries, have they a claim on economic grounds? Some

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<sup>4</sup> See Packer, G., "The Asian Relations Conference", *The Australian Outlook*, vol. i, 2 June 1947 pp. 3-7 and 55-63.

Indian writers in particular consider that the problems of over-population cannot be solved without emigration. R. Mukerjee,<sup>5</sup> for example, considers that there is room for Indians to expand in some of the island territories of the South-west Pacific, and for that matter to northern Australia. But if this is essential for the Indians, it will also be essential for the Chinese and the Indonesians, and there is no territory today that can absorb more than a minute fraction of the annual increase of Asiatic populations. And here we revert to the point made at the conclusion of our last chapter. If the Western peoples, with all their command over resources, adopt the nineteenth-century view that problems of over-population can only be solved by moving people to resources, instead of resources to the people, they will strengthen the case of those in the Asiatic countries who claim living space for their undernourished people. Because of the expanding rate of population growth that has already occurred in India and Indonesia, and that will occur in China and other areas of south-eastern Asia in response to improved technical efficiency, and because of the existing distribution of the world's population, migration can do little in the twentieth century to solve problems of over-population. The task of the Western peoples is rather to prove to the East that population density is not a barrier to decent standards of living, and that with modern technical and scientific development the problem of over-population can best be solved by the movement of resources to people, and not people to resources. However, we must again emphasize the fact that post-war political and economic trends in the West do not encourage the hope that there will be any increased mobility of resources in white countries in the immediate future, and until this does occur Asia can do little to solve its problem.

Nevertheless, the fact that emigration does not provide a solution to the problem of over-population in Asia is not adequate reason for preventing all Asiatic migration. The emigration of students, industrial leaders, and teachers, so that they can acquire scientific and industrial knowledge to apply in their home lands is a matter that should interest all those concerned with Asiatic welfare. In this regard the Australian schools and universities could play an important part, for without an adequate supply of technical skill the Asiatic countries cannot begin the mass attack on poverty that is the essential basis for their political independence as well as their escape from the Malthusian controls.

The argument of some Asiatic leaders that their peoples can only

<sup>5</sup> Mukerjee, R., *Population Problems in South East Asia* (Allahabad, 1945). See also Chandrasekhar, S. "Population Pressure in India", in *Pacific Affairs*, vol. xvi, number 2, (1945), pp. 166-84.

reduce over-population through emigration will continue to be justifiable to some extent until those nations that have developed a high degree of technical efficiency are prepared to assist in the large-scale development of Asiatic resources. To argue, as some Westerners have done, that industrialization should not be encouraged until the Asiatic peoples have learned to practise birth-control, is ridiculous, because without industrialization and literacy the fundamental conditions in which birth-control can be established will not exist. Further, it is to the vital interest of Australia that this industrialization should begin as soon as possible, for herein lies one of the best defences for her white immigration policy. Indeed, the maintenance of a White Australia policy is morally defensible only if it is accompanied by strong support in the councils of the nations for every move to assist the peoples of Asia to free themselves from the recurring threats of famine and disease. To plan a policy in opposition to Asia is to store up trouble for the future, even though that trouble may not become apparent for some generations. Nor should the economic aspects of Australian participation in Asiatic industrialization be ignored. If Australia is to carry a larger population, an expanding market will have to be found for a wide range of manufactured goods which must supplement primary exports if living standards in Australia are to be maintained at a high level. Asia can supply much of the raw material and other imports that Australia can use, for example, petroleum, cotton, and silk. With stationary and perhaps declining populations in Europe, and with much of Europe's needs being supplied by America and the Soviet Union in search of their own "ideological" security, Asia will tend to become increasingly important to the Australian economy.<sup>6</sup>

We have attempted to show (i) that the fulfilment of the present immigration plan will probably increase the power of Australia relative to that of Asia in the remainder of this century; (ii) that whereas increased population will strengthen Australia's economic position and her security, the same factor may weaken the position of Asiatic countries, unless industrialization can proceed at a pace rapid enough to increase *per capita* consumption; (iii) that the solution of Asia's population problem can only be found ultimately through extensive industrialization, not through emigration; (iv) that a White Australia policy is morally justifiable only if it is accompanied by a positive step by Australia to help reduce poverty in Asia.

Now while this may be the theory of the matter, it is not always

<sup>6</sup> The announcement in May 1948 of an Australian goodwill mission to south-east Asia is a pleasing indication that the present Government is alive to the importance of co-operation between Australia and Asia.

easy to make the practice fit the theory. Immigration involves passions and prejudices, as well as logical analysis. But while it is true that there is some feeling in Asiatic countries against the present technique of excluding immigrants, there is general recognition of the right of a sovereign country to control its own immigration policy.<sup>7</sup> The opposition is more against the method than the principle. That the method lacks subtlety may be admitted. It is difficult to see how an Asiatic can interpret the present Australian policy as being other than one of race prejudice. Nor can it be otherwise so long as Australians adhere to the term "White Australia" and then try to explain it away on economic grounds. Why not be honest? If the immigration policy is designed to serve economic ends, then abandon "White Australia" and call it the "Australian Immigration Policy". The application of a quota system has also been frequently mentioned as a method of ridding the policy of any suggestion that it is based on racial grounds.<sup>8</sup> Certainly a quota system based on the 1933 census, and similar to that applied in the United States, would not threaten Australia's "whiteness". For example, the Chinese in Australia in 1933 comprised only 0.05 per cent of the population, so that their annual quota in a total entry of 50,000 would be only 25. Nor need there be any fear that they would "outbreed" the Australians if they were encouraged to assimilate.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, the present policy of refusing naturalization to any whose skin is not "white" can also be taken by the Asiatic as evidence of racial prejudice.<sup>10</sup>

But changes in technique of this character are essentially negative in their approach, and the positive part of Australia's immigration policy must be support in the international sphere for economic and

7 This was accepted without serious opposition at the 1947 Inter-Asian Conference. See Packer, G. "The Asian Relations Conference", *Australian Outlook*, vol. i, 2 June 1947, pp. 3-7 and 55-63.

8 See Elkin, A. P., in *A White Australia?*

9 Studies of the fertility patterns of foreign-born elements (especially in America) reveal how quickly the fertility patterns of immigrant stock approximate to those economic, social and cultural groups amongst which they settle. Variations in the fertility patterns of first-generation immigration stock and native stock are usually apparent, but by the second generation there is usually little variation, provided no barriers have been placed in the way of assimilation. The fertility habits of Asiatics in Australia cannot be successfully studied, because of the small proportion of Asiatic women in the country. But an analysis of the fertility patterns of other immigrant stock in Australia in 1933 shows that those patterns vary according to the degree of urbanization, or according to occupational status. In general they tend to follow the patterns of the groups of Australian-born amongst whom they settle. See Borrie, W. D., "The Role of Immigrants in Population Growth", *Australian Quarterly*, vol. xvi, number 2 (June 1944), pp. 17-32.

10 While we feel that generally the present Minister of Immigration in the Commonwealth Government has done magnificent work for his country, we do consider that some statements and actions regarding non-white settlers in Australia, especially war-time refugees from Malaya and Indonesia, have not been politically wise. The somewhat abrupt manner in which the Indonesians were ordered back to their country after the war was resented by many Australians. Similarly, the determination to return the last 6000 Chinese refugees, some of whom have now established small businesses in Australia, is of questionable wisdom. A permit to allow these people to remain in Australia would do nothing to besmirch the country's whiteness, and might do something to spread goodwill.

social policies that will enable the Asiatic people to live a more adequate life within their own borders. This is the most formidable task the modern world has had to face, and upon its successful completion will depend, in the long run, not only the security of Australia, but the peace of the world. However critical we may be of Western imperialism in Asia during the past century, the fact remains that it has brought into production many of the resources of Asia that otherwise would probably have remained idle, and those areas that have now acquired political independence show no desire to allow those resources to go out of production. Indeed, they cannot do so without bringing about mass starvation and death, for improvements in irrigation, food supply and its distribution, and health services have already given an impetus to population growth. The problem now is to keep the development of resources one step ahead of the rate of population growth, and, through a mass attack on illiteracy, eventually to lay the basis for a more rational control of population increase. How to achieve these tremendous goals is beyond the scope of this study, but they are stated to emphasize two points: first, there is no quick or painless solution to the problem of over-population in Asia; and second, the West cannot readily escape, except with bad conscience, its responsibility in assisting Asia to find the ultimate solution, because the acuteness of the problem is in large measure the result of Western economic penetration in Asia.

Finally, although the principle of "White Australia" may not have been seriously attacked by Asiatic writers, it has been challenged by writers in "white" countries. Australian geographers, geologists, and economists have persistently pointed out that a good part of Australia is not only not a white man's country, but a no-man's-land.<sup>11</sup> Expeditions to the north of Australia have been persistently pessimistic about the prospects for closer settlement, and have pointed out that the most effective use that can be made of much of this territory is cattle grazing. On the other hand, the experience of the war has thrown some doubt upon the ultra pessimism of some of these reports.<sup>12</sup> It is quite certain that some areas of eastern and northern Queensland at least can carry a much denser population than they have at the moment. Just what population these areas will be able to carry in the future must be determined by further exploration and scientific research. And even

<sup>11</sup> The best summary of pre-war opinions regarding the potentialities of Australia's undeveloped areas is contained in W. D. Forsyth's, *The Myth of Open Spaces*.

<sup>12</sup> The recent proposals (April 1948) that Vestery Brothers should be given an extension of their leases (which at present have less than 20 years to run) if they can guarantee that their properties will be more fully developed indicates that the present Government is not satisfied that the grazing possibilities of the north are being fully utilized.

if it is shown that a denser population is possible, there remains the problem of attracting white migrants to live in these semi-tropical climates. So long as "industrial" Australia within the temperate zones has jobs to offer, migrants will not go easily to the isolated north — particularly migrants from northern and western Europe.

The likelihood that the population of some of the northern areas will remain for some time below their effective maximum will be a complicating factor in justifying a White Australia policy, but what some of those who see in these areas the solution to the over-population of Asia fail to realize is that at best they can carry only a few million people at reasonable standards of living, and that they may serve the real interests of Asia better by being exploited by a sparse population using highly skilled techniques than by a dense population with subsistence farming.<sup>13</sup> The best use that can be made of outlying parts of Australia is a matter that has yet to be decided, and that should be considered in relation to future economic and demographic trends in Asia as well as Australia, but to paint a fearful picture of Asiatic hordes sweeping over an underpopulated Australia is hardly justified at this stage. This may be Australia's fate in the long run if she plans her immigration policy on a basis of opposition to Asia, but at the moment quantity of population should not be confused with quality.

If Australians have tended to be too pessimistic about the carrying capacity of their island-continent, non-Australians have tended to be too optimistic. Some American writers, particularly since the last war, have tended to point to Australia's vast empty spaces on the one hand and to Asia's teeming millions on the other, and to conclude that the spaces are empty because Australia has adopted a kind of "dog-in-the-manger" attitude in regard to migration, and that Australia cannot for long hold back the pressure from Asia. She has, they will argue, perhaps a generation in which to show that these empty spaces can be used by white settlers. If she fails in this task the Asiatic hordes will sweep down upon her.<sup>14</sup> While we have no wish to defend the ultra-pessimistic view of some Australians regarding the resources of the northern part of their country—a view which may sometimes be the product of wishful thinking—we do wish to emphasize the point that the ultra-optimistic view is probably unnecessarily alarmist. It oversimplifies the issues

<sup>13</sup> The proposed experiments in Queensland, arising from the visit of the British Food Mission under Sir Henry Turner, to produce foodstuffs (e.g. bacon and ground-nuts) on a large scale by modern methods of mechanized farming, rather than by close settlement, may indicate the best uses that can be made of much of Australia's "undeveloped" areas. If these experiments are successful, production may be possible upon a scale wide enough to permit the export of foodstuffs to Asia as well as to Britain.

<sup>14</sup> This alarmist view is best expressed in W. S. Thompson's *Population and Peace in the Pacific*

discussed above—the nature of the population problem of Asia, the known resources of Australia's vast empty spaces, the problem of soil erosion that has already occurred, and the prospects of industrialization in Asia. Why it should be thought by non-Asiatics that Australia's empty spaces are the Elysium to which Asiatics will wish to come is not altogether clear. Much of Africa would be more congenial, so would many of the wide open spaces of California. And finally, are the Asiatics really conscious of a problem of over-population? The answer, for the vast majority of them, is almost certainly in the negative. That they will probably become conscious of a problem if industrialization proceeds should be recognized—which is another reason for seeing that the prospects for settlement in Australia's north are fairly presented, without either convenient under-statement or ignorant over-statement.

There is still some point—and there will remain some point so long as sand cannot be turned to productive use—in reminding the optimists that the British explorers found Australia virtually empty just because it was an arid continent. Would northern Australia have remained so sparsely populated before the British ever knew of its existence if it had been suitable for closer settlement? The fact is that the part of Australia most suited to relatively close settlement was so settled by 1880, and the attempt since then to push cultivation into "marginal" areas has already created a serious problem of erosion. Northern Australia can for the most part only be settled with any density if the raw materials for an industrial civilization are found there, and if an adequate water supply can be made available.

While it is almost certainly true that Australia's north has not the potentialities that some optimists ascribe to it, the fact remains that Australia can no longer afford to ignore the challenge of those who state that this country has undeveloped resources. The moment has indeed arrived for a re-examination, with the assistance of all the technical and scientific skill that the Commonwealth can command, of the economic possibilities of Australia's north; for the concern now being expressed in many quarters—for example, by the World Food and Agriculture Organization—that the world's population is outstripping its food supply means that no country can afford to have idle resources. Statistics showing that the world's population increased by 200 million between 1939 and 1945 have caused a revival of the Malthusian fear of over-population. The challenge has now to be accepted.

For Australia, moreover, this challenge concerns territory beyond its own borders, for the largest and most thinly populated

island of the world is trustee of New Guinea, the second largest island, which is also thinly populated, and which may have resources essential to the welfare of south-eastern Asia. Already suggestions have been made that New Guinea would provide an outlet for the crowded population of Japan. Australians may be forgiven for not welcoming the idea, and they can effectively make the point that emigration was never an important factor in bringing about an improvement in Japanese living standards; the important factor was Japan's place in world trade. Nevertheless, such suggestions are likely to be repeated in the future, if not on behalf of the Japanese then of other Asiatic peoples.

Trusteeship of New Guinea presents a problem much more complex than that of, say, the Solomon Islands or Samoa, where trusteeship means essentially native welfare. In New Guinea it will mean, unless scientific research and exploration prove it to be a comparatively barren country, both native welfare *and* more extensive development. If it is proved that New Guinea is capable of carrying a considerably denser population than many parts of Australia, or a population more numerous than that likely to emerge from the natural increase of the native people, what is to be done? Extensive white settlement in New Guinea would be difficult. An open door to non-whites would ignore the responsibilities of the trusteeship power towards the one and a half million native peoples. Immigration, whether white or non-white, must be considered in relation to the legitimate rights of these peoples. Yet it will be essential for the resources of New Guinea to be used as a contribution to the solution of the problem of population pressure in Asia, and particularly of south-east Asia. This factor the Australian Government must keep in mind. Essentially two questions have to be answered: What are the resources of New Guinea? How can they be efficiently utilized? If they cannot be so utilized by the existing population with the assistance of capital and equipment from Australia and elsewhere, further immigration will have to be considered in the long run. However, no good purpose is to be served at the moment by throwing New Guinea's doors open to all comers. The contribution of such a step to the relief of Asiatic over-population would be negligible, and there would be a danger of repeating in New Guinea the problems of racial minorities already present in Fiji, Malaya, and elsewhere. Further, an open-door policy would tend to reproduce subsistence agriculture in New Guinea and would therefore do little to use resources efficiently. The purpose of immigration should not be to use the island as a "sponge" to absorb a portion of the overflow from Asia,

but rather to encourage the development of resources to help prevent the need for an overflow. The precise manner in which such immigration should be controlled cannot be considered here, because it will depend upon the future estimate of the nature and extent of New Guinea's resources. At the moment we can merely emphasize that in time problems will probably arise that cannot be avoided here any more than in the case of Australia's north. And the problems connected with the former may prove more complex than those of the latter.

Finally, New Guinea presents an example of that extension of Australian interests in the Pacific which will require an adequate metropolitan population for protection. The problems connected with mandatory control after 1920 and trusteeship after 1945 could be handled without considering their relation to Australia's population so long as the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization were effective, or so long as Britain remained a strong Pacific power. Neither of these conditions obtains today, and Australia has now to be prepared to provide herself a large measure of the protection of these extended interests in the Pacific. Here is one argument, from the Australian point of view, for the decentralization of the population of the British Commonwealth. But here again we face the problem of how this can be achieved without damaging Britain's position in Europe, and thereby Australia's Western interests.

Those moulding Australia's immigration policy thus have a complex situation to face. While avoiding panic at the quantitative disparity between white and non-white in the Pacific, they have yet to make the fullest use they can of Australian resources without damaging the economic interests of the countries from which white immigrants come, and they must show that their immigration policy can be maintained without damaging the economic and social interests of the Asiatic people themselves. Here, in effect, is a challenge that calls for statesmanship of the highest order. The role Australia is to play in the Pacific in the future may well depend upon the success with which she handles her immigration policy.

## CHAPTER VII

### ASSIMILATION

UNTIL recent years Australian immigration schemes have paid little attention to problems of assimilation. Indeed, there has been no real awareness of a problem. British migrants have been coming to a country almost one hundred per cent British. The non-British minority was small enough to be practically ignored, and until recently the question of whether or not it has been absorbed into the Australian way of life has simply not been asked. The assumption has been that British immigrants have not required any conscious effort to assimilate them, and so long as Britain remained a sufficient reservoir to supply Australia's migrant needs there the matter was left.

Nevertheless assimilation, even of British migrants, did require a considerable adjustment on the part of the migrants themselves. True, the institutions of Australian society were essentially British. The legal code, ethical standards, customs, political and economic ideas, religious forms and working-class organization were broadly similar in both countries, which meant that the migrant found a set of social institutions in Australia whose forms at least were similar to those to which he had been accustomed in England. Yet there were differences. The yeoman migrant faced different rural conditions from those he had known in England; the unskilled labourer from the English industrial town had frequently to live and work in a remote area that had few of the social contacts to which he had been accustomed. Material standards of life might have been higher in the colony—and to achieve this was usually the object of emigration<sup>1</sup>—but in many aspects life in the colonies was harsher and more strenuous than the migrants had known. It was not the differences in social institutions so much as in the natural environment that demanded a pioneering spirit of the migrant who was to succeed in becoming an Australian—and the necessity for this spirit did not end when the land had been cleared and cultivated

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<sup>1</sup> Certainly from about 1860, when wages in the eastern colonies of Australia had been "boosted" by the gold rushes, until almost the end of the century wages were higher and working hours shorter in Australia than in Britain. Measured by this yardstick alone the colonies offered a definite advantage.

and when the first towns had been established. Until the end of the nineteenth century, and even later, the migrants entered communities which had little tradition behind them and were consequently difficult to understand and appreciate. None of the Australian colonies was in any true sense a "group" settlement, and none had the social solidarity of such a settlement. They tended to be rather collections of individuals, a phenomenon which was again as much the product of the natural environment as of the character of the pioneers. The church, the trade union, or relations, might offer opportunities for social intercourse, but the majority of the migrants have simply to break their way into Australian society.<sup>2</sup>

In the twentieth century the amount of "social pioneering" required by the British immigrant before he has been able to become assimilated—that is, to become an Australian—has been insufficiently recognized by the Australian-born community, which has retained a measure of intolerance to the new-comer. It has not been a malicious intolerance, but rather an inability to understand why any British-born subject should find any difficulty in assimilating himself. It has been essentially the accompaniment of a strident sense of nationalism, of that individualism which is a characteristic of the Australian, and of the comparative isolation of Australians from other cultures than their own. The term "Pommy", which has frequently been applied to the English settler in Australia, has for the most part not been used by the Australian as a term of abuse. Rather has it been used to differentiate the British migrant from the "dinkum Aussie".

Nevertheless this attitude of slight impatience, rather than intolerance, with what the Australian may have considered to be the "peculiarities" of the migrant has at times had a more serious effect upon the migrant than the Australian probably intended, especially when the migrant has had difficulty in finding economic security. For example, many of those who were assisted to Australia under the Empire Settlement Scheme after 1922 suffered economically from the failure of the land settlement schemes that were so elaborately planned. Some migrated to the towns and cities, sometimes to find their feet, sometimes to suffer, with Australians, the trials of unemployment during the depression. Others returned to their native land. Many of these migrants probably attributed their lack of success to Australian intolerance of the "foreigner", but it was due fundamentally to the failure of the economic system

<sup>2</sup> This is not a criticism of Australian society. It is merely an attempt to assess briefly its dominant features. What has been said here of Australia would largely hold for the other colonies at a similar stage of their development.

and to the lack of wisdom of those planning the scheme, which was unrealistic from the outset. The moral to be learned here is that unless the migrant meets with economic success, especially under a system of assisted immigration, he will tend to feel a grudge against both his sponsors and his country of adoption, and he will feel inclined to construe references to him as a "pommy" as expressions of disrespect.

The assimilation of British immigrants is likely to be a more difficult business in future migration than it has been in the past, for in our industrial society into which the migrant must now fit, with its complex division of labour, many of the migrants will be chosen because they possess the particular skill required for the development of some particular aspect of the Australian economy. A migrant is chosen because he is a builder, a carpenter, an electrical engineer, and so on. If that migrant fails to find satisfactory employment in the particular trade or industry for which he has been trained, he may become a dissatisfied settler. This problem did not arise to the same extent in the migration of the nineteenth century. Occupational mobility was easier, there was greater scope for individual initiative, and success could frequently be secured in a comparatively short time by the man with small capital. While it is probably still true that Australia offers more scope for the enterprising man with small means than does Britain, it is nevertheless true that success is now more difficult to attain for such a person. The gold rushes are over. The pioneering by individuals and small groups has been done. There is no evidence to suggest that Australia will have a moving frontier like that of the United States of America in the nineteenth century. It seems more likely that Australia has commenced its industrial revolution, and that the first stage of that revolution will be completed in the towns and cities already established, and that there will not be a spreading frontier here of "oil towns", "mining towns", and "gold towns". The problem is not to bring in migrants who are crying out for adventure, and who are prepared to "rough it" and to accept the hardships of the abnormal society of the frontier towns of the past, but rather to assimilate the average person who seeks economic security and social equality in a normal society. And these problems of assimilation become more complex as the standard of living rises.

In one respect, however, the task of the British or foreign migrant is easier than it has been, and will probably remain so for some time to come. The acute shortage of labour in Australia has quelled much of the opposition of the wage-earners to the migrant. They no longer fear that each new migrant will mean one job less for the

Australian worker. Most trade-union leaders at least, and many of the rank and file of labour too, now realize that migration, far from threatening labour standards, may improve them. More builders will mean more houses for workers in other industries, more textile workers will help to put an end to clothing shortages, and more farm labourers will end food rationing. This is the type of reasoning that has encouraged trade-union leaders to support the Government's immigration policy, and for the first time in Australia's history there is virtual agreement on the part of employers and many employees concerning the necessity for a vigorous immigration policy.

Thus the immigrant is not likely to meet with any hostility from the trade unions on economic grounds, and because of this he will find much less use of the term "pommy", and similar appellations, than did his predecessor. The main source of concern for the migrant may be the Australian policy of preference to Australian servicemen, whose interests are protected by an Act of the Commonwealth Parliament. The Minister of Immigration has made it clear that, while immigrants have complete equality with Australians regarding rates of pay and social service benefits, those who have served in the armed forces of their native country are not eligible for soldier preference. This issue, however, is not likely to be crucial so long as full employment lasts, and so long as the majority of immigrants have a guarantee of employment before they leave Britain.

But while the general attitude during the next few years is likely to be favourable to the assimilation of the British migrant, it should not be assumed that he can become an Australian in the full sense of the term immediately he lands. He may go straight to a job of work. If he is a nominated migrant he will have at least some relation or friend from whom he can seek advice. If he settles in one of the capitals he may also find life congenial enough, and in many respects not dissimilar to the life of an English town or city. The ubiquitous cinema, perhaps the one truly international institution of Western society, will be there for him to enjoy; the theatre will be there, though less in evidence, perhaps; his appetite for music can be fed; formal religion will be much as he knew it in Britain; he may even find a local library that interests him. On the other hand, he will not find the "pub" open after 6 p.m. as "the workman's club"; he will probably find people less socially minded, and more inclined to seek recreation away from the home; there will be horses and dogs but no football pool; he will find less community life. These are all small enough matters that need cause no serious

problem to the normal person. With a little goodwill on both sides, the Australian's as well as the migrant's, the process of assimilation should be achieved in six months, or a year at the outside.

But all migrants do not settle in the cities. Some go to the country towns.<sup>3</sup> Here the welcome is likely to be warmer and less impersonal than in the city, but the settler from an English town or city will find considerable differences from his native land. He may feel isolated; he may find the climate unexpectedly hard at times; and he may find opportunities for social intercourse fewer than in his home country. But here again there should be no real problem, given goodwill and reasonable tolerance on both sides.

But there is another problem. Besides highly skilled persons Australia wants also building labourers, railway workers, and agricultural labourers. For these life may be very different from the one they knew—and very difficult. For example, the worker helping to unify Australia's railways, to construct roads in the interior, or to build houses in remote country towns must of necessity be isolated for a considerable part of his time from many of the amenities that he probably enjoyed in England. He may be fed better, clothed better, and secure a higher wage—but he may be cut off from the life of the city or village community to which he is accustomed. Although no analysis has been made—or at least revealed—of the reasons why numbers of the carpenters who were introduced to Canberra early in 1947 had left by the end of the year, it is not improbable that in many instances the reason was the lack of many of the amenities to which they had been used in England. This type of migrant requires particular attention, for if such a group is not successfully assimilated its members may do much by their dissatisfaction to prejudice many others who would otherwise take their place in the Australian community.

Indeed, one of the problems to which modern migration schemes give rise is just their highly selective tendencies. The tendency is increasingly to choose the migrant so that he or she will fit into a particular occupation, and there is a danger that the occupations that will ultimately be shortest of manpower will be the hardest and least pleasant. A survey of the immigrant plans of Western countries today illustrates this point. The Latin Americas want

<sup>3</sup> With the post-war policy of encouraging decentralization of industry, immigrants may have to go to the "country" towns rather than to the cities in search of industrial employment. But, because of the natural barriers against large-scale decentralization it is likely that much less than half the immigrants will go outside the capital cities.

farm labourers and unskilled workers, with the skilled jobs apparently to be filled by the Latin Americans themselves. France wants domestics, unskilled labourers and miners from Italy and Germany. Britain wants a proportion of the same types. Just because skilled labour is scarce, even in many of those areas which are considered to have a high emigration potential, migrants may, in the long run, have to come increasingly from the unskilled occupations, and the supply of skilled manpower in the immigrant countries will tend to be provided increasingly by the training of their own nationals.<sup>4</sup> In this situation there will develop a tendency for the immigrant to be recruited to the lower paid and socially "less desirable" positions. In other words there is a danger that the migrant will become the hewer of wood and drawer of water for those modern industrial communities whose demographic trends are inadequate to supply a sufficient stream of indigenous labour. And in societies in which occupational mobility has not become notably easier the immigrant may find it difficult to rise from that status. This is the type of problem that must receive very careful consideration if "selective" and "assisted" migration to an industrial community is going to ensure equality of opportunity for both migrant and Australian-born.

This last question is one that is likely to be of greatest relevance to non-British immigration. Here again, Australians have paid little attention to the matter of assimilation, and the attitude has not always been as friendly as to the British immigrant. It cannot be doubted that many Australians—like many New Zealanders, Canadians, and even Englishmen—do not warm easily to the southern European. They do prefer "Nordic" stock. The attitude to southern Europeans may indeed in some measure illustrate the problem which we have just been discussing. For the most part they have come into the country to unskilled occupations, and they have been treated apart from the "Australian" community. They have been tolerated, but they have not been welcomed, except in so far as they have been able to serve a useful purpose in the economic system as market gardeners, fruiters and small tradesmen. They have tended to live apart, rather than to be merged with the communities amongst whom they have settled.

Perhaps the best illustration of the problem of assimilation of the southern European is the Italians of the Queensland sugar

<sup>4</sup> This is a problem that has not yet been foreshadowed in the Australian migration plans. While those plans make provision for a number of unskilled workers, the main emphasis is upon skilled personnel. Because of the general scarcity of this type of labour Australia may be driven to take more unskilled labour to fill its migrant quota. Such labour will have either to be trained in Australia, or to replace Australian-born persons who have been suitably trained.

plantations.<sup>5</sup> Here they were tolerated, and even welcomed so long as they did not compete with white labour and white owners. When many of the Italians through, be it admitted, long hours of toil and co-operation amongst themselves, were economically successful, attitudes tended to harden. But many of the problems of assimilation that arose here could have been avoided if some body had existed which could have considered impartially the claims of both sides, which could have offered constructive proposals for minimizing friction and which could have taken steps to see that the Italians in the area understood such matters as wage regulations, and working hours and conditions in the State. The experiment of introducing a non-British minority to Queensland without prior attention to these problems of assimilation should be a warning of what to avoid; for the assimilation of foreign migrants, with a foreign language and a foreign culture, cannot be achieved unless the migrants are prepared to adapt themselves to their new social environment and unless the local community is prepared to give sympathetic assistance. Unsympathetic opposition on the part of the Australian community will encourage non-British migrants to form group settlements, and unwillingness on the part of the migrants to learn the language and study the customs of their land of adoption will encourage opposition to them by the Australians, thereby raising barriers against assimilation.

The Commonwealth Government has assiduously set its face against the idea of group settlements, and rightly so. A study of the history of group settlements does not provide an encouraging picture. In few cases have they succeeded, even in the cases of British settlements in a British community.<sup>6</sup> Further, there are few areas in Australia that lend themselves to this type of settlement. One essential for such a settlement is compactness, which may be made possible by adequate industrial resources or a fertile soil. Without this the settlement tends to disintegrate, the ideals on which the settlement was founded are lost, and there usually follows a dispersal of the settlers to other areas.<sup>7</sup>

5 The tendency for the German communities of South Australia to maintain a "separate" existence might also be noted. The slow assimilation of these northern Europeans may have been to some extent due to German characteristics, but it was probably also the result of Australian hostility to Germans during the war of 1914-18. Another factor was the tendency for the Germans to pursue their livelihood in a single industry, the wine industry (see Lyng, J., *Non-Britishers in Australia*, [Melbourne, 1935] 2nd ed.), also Price, C. A., *German Settlers in South Australia* (Melbourne, 1945). In view of the problems of assimilation that will arise with the pursuit of the present immigration policy, the time is appropriate for a thorough sociological study of such minority groups in Australia as the Germans and Italians.

6 The history of the many group settlements attempted in British colonies in the nineteenth century is illuminating. There were only two or three successful settlements. The official records of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission give accounts of many elaborately planned schemes which were costly failures.

7 On this point Edward Gibbon Wakefield gave some sound advice over a century ago.

Early in the war, the Government of Western Australia (and later the Commonwealth Government) was pressed by a Jewish organization to consider a group settlement of Jews in the Ord River region of the Kimberleys. The object was the closer settlement of the river area and the cultivation of tropical fruits and vegetables, as well as the grazing of cattle. Those sponsoring the scheme hoped apparently to reproduce in Australia a colony similar to the Jewish group settlement in the Republic of Santo Domingo. But while the latter had many of the essentials of a successful group settlement, the Kimberley project had few. With the present state of transport it would have been impossible to put goods on the market at prices which could compete with those grown in the settled areas, and the settlement could not have been integrated with the economy of the south.<sup>8</sup> Further, the trials of living in the north during the wet season under primitive pioneering conditions had been greatly underestimated. A subsequent expedition of geographers and geologists to this area confirmed the wisdom of the Government in opposing the settlement, and revealed once again that until much more exploratory work is done regarding soil conditions, rainfall, and resources, such areas can best be used by cattle grazing. Any attempt to settle them closely without thorough preliminary scientific investigation would threaten to produce an extension of Australia's already serious problem of soil erosion.

Group settlements are in effect an admission of failure. Successful immigration on any scale can only be considered on the basis of assimilation, not of separation. This the Government has realized, and measures are being taken to ensure that the non-British immigrants are successfully merged into the communities in which they settle. It has been suggested, for example, that the grant of naturalization should be more than the issue of a document, and that it should be accompanied by a simple and dignified ceremony to impress upon the immigrant the fact that he is becoming a citizen of the Commonwealth. But while ceremony may play its part in assimilation much more than this is needed. More significant is the guarantee of the Government that there will be no discrimination against the migrant in respect of employment, wages, or conditions of work. But even this is not enough. The migrant for his part must be prepared to recognize regulations regarding employment, and not seek advantages, and the Australian for his part must recognize that the migrant cannot become adjusted

<sup>8</sup> A criticism by the cattle-men of the north of the British Food Mission's visit in April 1948 may be observed here. They emphasized that the problem was not so much the capacity of the runs to carry more stock as the lack of facilities for transporting the beasts to the killing stations and the beef to the ports for shipping overseas.

to his new environment immediately. That adjustment can occur only as the migrant gains a knowledge of the language, customs, and traditions of the country. For this reason courses of instruction for migrants should be encouraged, and could perhaps be organized through the adult education schemes now in existence, for example, the Workers Educational Association, and the Tutorial Classes Departments of the Universities. If the migrants themselves can organize such classes, so much the better. A promising move amongst the refugee migrants in Sydney was the organization during the war of the New Citizens Association, which arranged lectures and sought articles for its paper by Australians who were authorities on various aspects of the national life. A further measure which might be considered is the establishment of Immigrants Advice Bureaux, where the new settler can seek information and help upon such matters as employment regulations, social services, education, and naturalization.

The awareness of the Government of some of these problems is seen in the establishment of an immigrants' "school" at Bonegilla, a former army camp near Albury in New South Wales. Here some of the newly recruited European refugee migrants have been put through courses designed to facilitate their assimilation. They are given a knowledge of English, a course of instruction in Australian laws and social customs, and an indication of the "Australian attitude to life". Motion pictures and documentary films are extensively used in this training. The idea is excellent, if it is well executed. Such instruction cannot replace the knowledge of Australian habits and customs gained by contact with an Australian community, but it can provide a basis for the reception of that knowledge. The danger is, of course, that the immigrants will get a false impression of the Australian way of life in their brief sojourn at Bonegilla. If they are introduced through films to Sydney and Melbourne will they accept kindly a railway camp on the Nullarbor Plains as their place of employment? This illustrates again the problem of selective migration. Nevertheless the concern of the Government to see that non-British migrants do enter the Australian community with some knowledge of its laws and customs is a step in the right direction.

Further, an important aspect that should be considered is the education of immigrant children, which should of course be given in schools attended by Australian children. A reasonable understanding by the latter of the difference in outlook they will observe in the former can be encouraged by careful handling by teachers. Through history and geography particularly both the Australian

and non-Australian children can gain a better understanding of one another. Here again ceremony—for example, the saluting of the flag at the beginning of each day—can play its part, but much more important than this is the intermingling of children in the normal routine of school life without restraint and without prejudice.

These problems will become more acute if the Government is forced to turn increasingly to non-British sources for migrants. As we have noticed, contracts had already been made for the introduction of 12,000 refugees in 1948, and the Minister of Immigration has since raised this to 20,000 if shipping is available. The successful assimilation of these people will require mutual understanding as well as adequate institutions. Without these such migrants will tend to keep apart from the normal Australian community, even though they may not be a group settlement in the strict sense of that term. There has been some criticism of the refugee immigration immediately before and during the war on this score. Complaints have been made that they have tended to live apart and to retain their own institutions and customs. Since the war, too, more serious allegations have been made, for example, that the refugees have been "cornering" the real estate market, that they have been securing houses and jobs that should have gone to Australian ex-servicemen, and that they have been organizing industry amongst themselves to compete with Australian industry. What foundation of truth there is in these reports is not easy to assess, because no adequate sample survey has been made of the extent to which the refugees have become assimilated. But it is probably true that many of the refugees did secure accommodation, which was not unexpected, because they were nominated immigrants who were given landing permits only if they had guarantee of a place to live. Similarly they had to be guaranteed employment, and as their nominators were frequently refugees they would go in the normal course of events to positions controlled by refugees. Further, they were only admitted if they could guarantee surety of £200, which gave them some small capital with which to begin an industry or trade on at least a modest basis. Indeed, the whole scheme of refugee immigration encouraged refugee co-operation rather than intermingling with Australians, for it was only thus that they could get into the country, and once in it was only thus, in the initial stages at least, that most of them could refrain from becoming public charges.

Thus while it may reasonably be concluded that many of the refugees did readily find homes and employment, it should also

be remembered that these were the conditions of their entry. But the sharp criticism of them by some "loyal Australian" bodies indicates the manner in which misunderstandings could lead to separation.<sup>9</sup> The foreigner, if sensitive to criticism, will tend to withdraw from the majority and, through co-operation with his own kind, to protect himself, which will encourage further attacks by the Australian on the grounds that he is not prepared to become assimilated. So misunderstanding may grow, though originally the criticism may not have been intended maliciously.

In short, then, the problem of assimilation is one that should receive careful attention by those planning Australia's migration scheme, for it is probable that to fulfil the quota of 70,000 immigrants a year for any substantial period a considerable proportion of the migrants must be non-British. As we emphasized earlier, the days have passed when Australia could handpick the migrants required. Now it is a case of taking what is available. And while the acute shortage of labour lasts, economic security, which is the first essential condition of rapid assimilation, will be there. But this alone will not be enough. The assimilation of the migrant is a more complex affair in an industrial community than in a pioneering community. In the case of countries with a similar cultural background, differences in attitudes and customs between the country of origin and the country of settlement may decide whether or not an immigrant is to become a successful settler. Where the migrant comes from a country with widely different standards the problem is in some respects more complex, but easier to overcome because it is more obvious. Compromise by both parties is needed in either case. Uninformed criticism of local customs by the immigrant not yet aware of the background from which they have sprung, or a similar lack of understanding by the Australian of the migrant's cultural background, can only render the task of assimilation the more difficult. And finally, while the migrant probably comes to Australia because he considers Australia has some quality that his own country has not—whether economic, social, or cultural—no good purpose is served by taking the line that Australia is God's own country. It may be better to tell him that some have suggested that Australia is a country of uniformly monotonous scenery and a monotonously uniform society. The truth will be that the migrant will find some things to his liking and some not. And if both migrant and native white are prepared to learn from the other,

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<sup>9</sup> Some particularly sharp criticisms of refugees were made in 1947 by the Returned Soldier Association and the Australian Natives Association.

Australia will profit, not only in population and economic well-being, but also in tolerance and cultural attainment.

In conclusion, one further factor may be mentioned—the balance of the sexes amongst immigrants. This perhaps bears more closely upon demographic problems than assimilation, but nevertheless it is relevant to the latter. At the moment Australia's immigration policy gives first priority to single male migrants, for the obvious reason that homes are not yet available for the migrants with families. But from the long-term aspect it is desirable that an even balance of the sexes should be maintained.

The demographic argument for such a balance can be briefly stated. Australia is not a country with any surplus of females of reproductive age. The war of 1914-18, with its heavy casualties of young males, did tend to create a "surplus" of females. That war cost Australia 59,300 young male lives, with the result that in 1921 there was a slight excess of females in the age-group 21-44 (997,117 females compared with 996,413 males). The imbalance was quickly corrected by the immigration in the post-war years. Between 1921 and 1925 183,000 immigrants settled in Australia, among whom males outnumbered females in the ratio of almost two to one. Thus Australia corrected the imbalance of the sexes within a decade, whereas most European belligerents were not to recover that balance among the age-groups essential to reproduction for a generation—that is until approximately the outbreak of the second World War. From the demographic point of view the consequences of the second World War upon Australia have been unimportant. Casualties have been comparatively slight and there is no surplus of women in the childbearing age-groups.

Now a high ratio of males to females amongst the post-war immigrants will tend to raise the reproduction rate, if we assume that married fertility remains at the pre-war level, because with a surplus of males probably a higher proportion of fertile women will marry than pre-war. But if a proportion of males is compelled to remain single in our monogamous society the level of the crude birth-rate will tend to fall. This tempts the conclusion that male immigration will have no serious effect upon the level of reproduction. Nevertheless it may have more serious social consequences, because once those males have passed their working years they will tend to swell the ranks of the aged dependants, which, as we saw in Chapter I, will tend to grow at a faster rate in Australia than the breadwinning population in the near future. Even without immigration those aged 65 and over will double by the end of the century. An increased burden of aged dependants may tend to

lower reproduction in the long run, because of the high proportion of income that will have to be taken from breadwinners in taxation for their support. In short, large-scale immigration that is only of temporary duration and adds to the number of the childless in the community will ultimately accentuate that ageing tendency of the population which we have already observed.

The introduction of males in large numbers will compel a considerable proportion of them to remain unmarried. If this occurs some may emigrate again to places where they can enjoy normal family life.<sup>10</sup> The single male tends to be an itinerant gentleman, and those planning Australia's post-war migration policy might do well to heed the century-old dictum of Caroline Chisholm that the stabilizing factor of social life is "God's police—wives and little children". Even if we ignore the sentimental, the dictum still has its moral. Further, an even balance of the sexes will help to raise the level of births in Australia, which is the only sure long-term basis for the prevention of population decline. Finally, the opportunity to immigrate with wives and families, or to bring out fiancées at an early date, will encourage assimilation in the Australian community. For the northern European intermarriage with Australians may be comparatively easy, because the cultural differences are not great. But in the case of southern Europeans the difficulties are greater. A study of the statistics of marriages among non-British migrants during the inter-war years shows that some eighty per cent of northern European, compared with less than twenty per cent of southern European, migrant males married Australians. The former tended to be assimilated more quickly than the latter and consequently to intermarry more readily. The latter tended to work and save until they could pay the passage of their brides or fiancées from their country of origin. Had they been able to bring their women folk with them to Australia their assimilation might have been more rapid—and their reproduction might have been greater.

Migration assistance was not organized under the control of the Commonwealth Government until 1920. All States assisted nominated and approved migrants until 1873. In that year Victoria abandoned assistance; South Australia followed in 1886; New South Wales in 1887; and Tasmania in 1891. Extensive assistance was not revived again in these States until 1906. From the above table it is apparent that State selected migrants have been much

<sup>10</sup> In passing it may not be irrelevant to speculate upon the effect of a surfeit of males upon the Australian divorce rate. It is not improbable that, conversely, the rise in the divorce rate in most Western countries in the inter-war period was in some measure due to the surplus of young women of marriageable age which was the result of the war casualties of 1914-18.

more numerous than those nominated by private individuals and organizations.

**APPENDIX**  
**A. IMMIGRATION STATISTICS**

The figures in this Appendix are extracted from Demography Bulletins, Year Books and Quarterly Statistical Returns of the Commonwealth of Australia.

**NET IMMIGRATION AND NATURAL INCREASE 1861-1947**

Period	Population at end of Period (thousands)	Net Immigration During Period (thousands)			Natural Increase (thousands)	Total Increase (thousands)	Average Annual Rates of Increase (per cent)	
		Males	Females	Total			Net Migration	Natural Increase
1861-70	1,648	79.3	87.2	166.5	335.6	502.1	1.20	2.43
1871-80	2,232	124.2	67.6	191.8	391.9	583.7	0.98	2.05
1881-90	3,151	244.3	138.5	382.8	537.1	919.9	1.46	2.01
1891-1900	3,765	14.7	10.2	24.9	589.1	614.0	0.05	1.70
1901-05	4,032	-7.1	-9.6	-16.7	284.4	267.7	-0.08	1.46
1906-10	4,425	38.0	19.3	57.3	334.8	392.1	0.26	1.59
1911-15	4,969	40.4	96.5	136.9	407.5	544.4	0.65	1.71
1916-20	5,411	48.5	22.2	70.7	371.1	441.8	0.27	1.46
1921-25	6,003	117.4	65.8	183.2	408.5	591.7	0.64	1.43
1926-30	6,501	73.3	56.4	129.7	368.0	497.7	0.42	1.17
1931-35	6,753	-10.6	-0.2	-10.8	263.2	252.4	-0.03	0.79
1936-40	7,069	20.9	22.2	43.1	315.6	358.7	0.06	0.79
1941-45	7,431	5.4	2.4	7.8	373.7	381.5	0.02	1.03
1946	7,519	5.3	-9.8	-15.1	101.4	86.3	-0.04	1.36
Jan.-June 1947	—	0.5	-0.4	0.1	60.1	60.2	—	1.59

**B. NOMINATED AND SELECTED MIGRATION 1901-1940**

Period	Nominated	Selected	Total Assisted	Total Net Immigration
1901-05	*	*	—	16,700
1906-10	7,945	*	—	57,300
1911-15	30,111	120,443	150,554	136,900
1916-20	2,326	9,305	11,631	70,700
1921-25	23,090	92,358	115,448	183,200
1926-30	19,881	78,522	99,403	129,700
1931-35	156	625	781	-10,800
1936-40	768	3,062	3,828	43,100

\*Not available.

*Note.* From the earliest times to the end of 1910, the total of assisted immigration has been officially estimated at 686,666, so that the total assisted until 1940 would be 1,068,311. In the above figures all assisted persons entering the country in each quinquennium are compared with the total net immigration. The net figures of assisted immigrants are not available, as emigration statistics do not record what departing persons originally entered the country as assisted immigrants.

## C. NET IMMIGRATION BY NATIONALITY

Nationality	Period	Numbers	Per cent of Total Gain or Loss
British	1921-25	152,290	84.8
	1926-30	100,889	80.9
	1931-35	-10,390	-9.54
	1936-40	14,665	34.0
U.S.A.	1921-25	2,732	1.5
	1926-30	691	0.5
	1931-35	-54	-0.5
	1936-40	492	1.14
French	1921-25	419	0.2
	1926-30	53	0.0
	1931-35	87	0.8
	1936-40	2	0.0
German	1921-25	194	0.1
	1926-30	1,184	1.0
	1931-35	152	1.4
	1936-40	7,302	16.9
Greek	1921-25	3,391	1.9
	1926-30	1,774	1.4
	1931-35	-194	-1.8
	1936-40	3,478	8.1
Italian	1921-25	13,582	7.6
	1926-30	10,446	8.4
	1931-35	1,523	14.0
	1936-40	7,650	17.7
Yugoslav	1921-25	412	0.2
	1926-30	2,116	1.7
	1931-35	-39	-0.4
	1936-40	1,600	3.7
Other European	1921-25	7,616	4.2
	1926-30	8,294	6.7
	1931-35	-43	-3.9
	1936-40	7,039	16.3
Total European	1921-25	180,636	100.5
	1926-30	125,447	100.6
	1931-35	-9,346	-85.8
	1936-40	42,228	97.9
Non-European	1921-25	-968	-0.5
	1926-30	-797	-0.7
	1931-35	-1,540	-14.15
	1936-40	900	2.1
Total	1921-25	179,668	100
	1926-30	124,650	100
	1931-35	-10,886	100
	1936-40	43,128	100

No comparable figures are available for earlier years than 1921. The discrepancies between the totals of this table and of Table A, for the years 1921-25, and 1926-30, should be noticed. They are sufficiently marked to suggest doubt concerning the accuracy of many of the earlier statistics relating to migration.

## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

THE purpose of these notes is to draw the attention of readers to a number of published works that provide both a historical background to, and a wider discussion of contemporary aspects of, the matters discussed in this book. They are designed to supplement the footnotes given in the text. The list is by no means exhaustive, but it does include a number of well-documented books from which the student who may wish to pursue the subject further can build up an adequate bibliography of Australian secondary sources.

For the early settlements the following are useful: E. O'Brien, *The Foundation of Australia, 1786-1800* (London, 1937); R. C. Mills, *The Colonization of Australia, 1829-42* (London, 1915); and B. Fitzpatrick, *British Imperialism and Australia, 1783-1833* (London, 1939). The best available study of migration regulations and policy before 1850 is R. B. Madgwick's *Immigration into Eastern Australia, 1788-1851* (London, 1937). W. A. Carrothers's *Emigration from the British Isles* (London, 1929) also has some useful material on both early settlement and later developments, such as the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, but the reader needs to watch for careless statements or faulty references.

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